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CHAPTER I

Il\'TRODUCTION
The Problem
In an era of increased public scrutiny and accountability, hindsightful evaluations of others' decisions are frequently required.
study was

This

designed to investigate the very assumption that underlies

the fair evaluation of others' decisions, namely, that people can perceive how a situation was experienced rather than how it should have
been experienced given the illumination of hindsight.
The fairness or objectivity of second-guessing is a crucial issue
for professionals or experts called upon to make decisions that affect
other people.

Some of the professionals more frequently and publically

challenged include political leaders, economists, educators, physicians,
psychologists, police officers, and baseball managers.

When second-gu-

essed by hindsightful observers, "mistakes" for members of these and
other groups can

be interpreted as incompetence, negligence, or worse.

The objectivity of second-guessing is also a crucial issue for
those who are called upon to objectively assess the judgment of others.
Our legal strategy for evaluating people's judgment relies almost exclusively on the hindsight of some to judge the foresight of others.

Yet

it may be that cognitive biases associated with hindsight preclude the
required objectivity.
objectivity may

Thus, the very system we designed to enhance

actually minimize that objectivity and consequently,

the justice that is served.
1

2

The Fallibility of Predictive Judgment
Much of the early research on predictive judgment was marked by a
distinctive rationalistic bias.

It was assumed that people relied on

mathematically optimal strategies for all their judgment needs.

Accord-

ing to this view, errors in judgment resulted from one of two things.
Either there were accidental errors due to problems with the information
or there was cognitive interference from some irrational motives or
needs (Fischhoff, 1976; Hammond,McClelland, & Mumpower, 1980; Taylor,
1982).
Meehl' s (1954) classic monograph first reviewed evidence to show
that linear combinations of information outperform the intuitive judgments of clinicians in behavioral prediction.

Meehl's observations were

controversial, attracting much interest in the study of predictive judgment in a variety of contexts (Wiggins, 1973).

None of the subsequent

studies that focused on clinical and statistical prediction were
to demonstrate clinical superiority (Dawes, 1976; Goldberg,
1962; Sawyer, 1966).

able

1968; Gough,

Moreover, later studies of predictive judgment

were able to document a disconcerting lack of judgmental accuracy across
task and situational factors with a variety of subject populations
(e.g., Einhorn & Hogarth, 1981;Lichtenstein & Fischhoff, 1977; Slovic,
Fischhoff, & Lichtenstein, 1977; Szucko & Kleinmuntz, 1981).

Perhaps

even more disturbing were the additional findings that people, experts
and non-experts alike, maintained

great confidence in their fallible

judgment (e.g., Einhorn & Hogarth, 1978; Fischhoff, Slovic, & Lichtenstein,

1977; Kahneman & Tversky, 1973,

hoff, 1977; Oskamp, 1982).

1982; Lichtenstein & Fisch-
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Because of the rapidly diminishing empirical support for the
rationalistic approach to the study of judgment, a major shift occurred
in the literature towards the study of predictable departures from optimality (Abelson & Levi, 1985; Hammond et al., 1980; Markus & Zajonc,
1985).

Kahneman

and

Tversky

(1973,1982;

Tversky

& Kahneman,

1971,1982a,1982b,1983) traced some of the predictable errors in judgment
to the use of heuristics or simplication strategies.

For instance, they

found that the "availability" of information influenced judgment.

Spe-

cifically, if people could think of several instances of one kind of
event as compared to another, they were inclined to think that the former event occurs more frequently than the latter.
heuristics

is valid.

Sometimes the use of

For example, it is often true that instances of

more frequent events, such as losing baseball seasons in Chicago, are
recalled more easily than instances of less frequent events, (i.e., winning seasons).

Other times, however, it can lead to systematic biases.

For instance, the use of the availability heuristic has been associated
with the overestimation of well-publicized events, such as deaths due to
homocide or cancer,

and the underestimation of less well-publicized

events, such as deaths due to asthma and diabetes (Lichtenstein, Slavic,
Fischhoff, Layman, & Combs, 1978).
The

work of Kahneman and Tversky inspired a wealth of research on

systematic biases in predictive judgment.

This work documented a series

of biases associated specifically with the estimation of outcome probabilities.

For instance, when estimating outcomes, people have been

found to disregard base-rate information (Bar-Hillel, 1973; Nisbett &
Borgida, 1975; Tversky & Kahneman, 1982a), to be generally oblivious to
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questions of sample size (Tversky & Kahneman, 1971, 1974), to overweigh
positive occurrences of an event more than non-occurrences (Einhorn &
Hogarth, 1978; Estes-, 1976), to seek and retain information that confirms an impression and to disregard or forget information that is disconfirmatory (Beyth & Fischhoff, 1977; Cohen, 1981; Einhorn & Hogarth,
1978; Mynatt, Doherty,
1982; Snyder
the

&

&

Tweeney,

1977; Snyder, Campbell,

Cantor, 1979; Snyder

probability of

lel, 1973 ;Einhorn

&

related events
Hogarth,

1978;

&

&

Preston,

Swann, 1978), and to overestimate
occurring together

(Bar-Hil-

Fischhoff ,Slavic, & Lichtenstein,

1977; Tversky & Kahneman, 1982b).
Hindsight Bias
The Phenomenon
One bias that this work identified, which has both theoretical and
practical significance, has been labeled hindsight bias, creeping determinism, or the knew-it-all- along effect (Fischhoff, 1975a,1975b,1977).
Hindsight bias, as it will be called here, refers to certain judgmental
distortions that result once people have been informed of the outcome to
a situation.
inevitable.

First, the particular outcome seems, with hindsight, to be
Second, people not only tend to view the outcome as

inevi-

table, but also view it as having appeared "relatively inevitable"
before it happened. That is, they see direct relationships between certain preceding events and what eventuated.

Third, people underestimate

the effect that outcome information has on their predictions.

They mis-

remember their own foresightful predictions so as to exaggerate in hindsight what they actually reported knowing in foresight.

Finally, people

5

wrongly estimate that those without benefit of hindsight have the same
predictive

capabilities

hoff, 1975a, 1975b,

as

those

1977; Fischhoff

&

with

hindsight.

Beyth-Marom,

(Fisch-

1975; Wood,

1978).

Moreover, the distortions associated with hindsight bias have been found
to be strongest for

events initially judged to be the least plausible

(Arkes,~ortman,Saville,

& Harkness, 1981; Fischhoff, 1977; Wood, 1978).

Fischhoff (1975a,1975b), who pioneered this line of inquiry, first
demonstrated
dictions.

the effect of outcome information on individual pre-

In a prototypical experiment, all subjects were first given a

passage to read.

Subjects had been

randomly assigned to conditions

with various outcome information included at the end of the passage.
Control subjects received no outcome information.

After reading the

material, all subjects were asked to make probability judgments about
the likelihood of
what happened."

certain outcomes

occurring "as if they did not know

Hindsight bias was evidenced when the probabilities

assigned to an outcome were higher among those who read of that particular outcome than among those who had no knowledge of that outcome occuring.
For example, in one experiment, Fischhoff (1975a) had subjects
read an unfamiliar historical passage describing the beginning of a
struggle between the British colonials and the Gurkhas of Nepal in 1814.
The passage told of some minor defeats suffered by the British but
excluded any information about the ultimate victor.

Subjects were then

asked to make probabilistic predictions concerning several mutually
exclusive outcomes including British victory, Gurkha victory, military
stalemate with no peace settlement, and military stalemate with a peace
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settlement.

Subjects were also asked to indicate which statements in

the passage were particularily relevant to their predictions. Hindsight
bias was apparent when subjects who were told of a Gurkha victory, for
instance, perceived it as more likely than those who were given either
no outcome information or different outcome information.
In the same study, relevance attributed to any datum was found to
be highly dependent on which outcome subjects believed to have occurred.
If the item was supportive of the outcome's occurrence, then it was more
likely to be considered relevant.

For example, the item "the British

officers learned caution only after sharp reverses" was considered the
most relevant statement by subjects informed of a British victory; this
statement was considered comparatively irrelevant by subjects who read
of other outcomes and by subjects who received no outcome information.
In another early study of hindsight bias, subjects were asked to
make probabilistic predictions concerning current events rather than
historic scenarios (Fischhoff & Beyth, 1975).

Immediately before former

President Nixon's 1972 trip to China and the USSR, subjects were asked
to predict 15 possible outcomes,including, for example, the chances that
the USA would establish a permanent diplomatic mission in Peking or that
the USA and USSR would agree to a joint space program.

Some time after

the actual Nixon visit, subjects were unexpectedly asked to recall their
predictions.

Results showed that subjects recalled probabilistic pre-

dictions that were higher than their original predictions for the events
they believed had actually occurred and lower for those that they
believed had not occurred.

(Subjects were not always accurate in their

recollections of the events that had actually occurred.)

In other
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words, subjects recalled

being much more clairvoyant than was actually

the case.
Explanations of Hindsight Bias
The early studies of hindsight bias demonstrated clearly that outcome information biased predictive judgment and that people were largely
unaware of falling prey to the bias.

Were these findings indicative of

a cognitive bias or were there motivational, artifactual, or situational
reasons

for

the predictive distortions?

Results

from

subsequent

research pointed convincingly to a cognitive interpretation of hindsight
bias with little or no support for alternative explanations.

For

instance, a series of motivational interpretations were consistently not
supported by experimental results.
hindsight bias

represented

Fischhoff (1977) examined whether

the result of people having, but not apply-

ing, the appropriate cognitive talent.
nate

Specifically,he tried to elimi-

hindsight bias by exhorting subjects to work harder.

beginning their task, subjects were told:
important to us.

Before

"Your responses are extremely

The effort you invest in them will largely determine

the value of our subsequent study.

Please devote as much attention to

this task as you can.

This manipulation was unsuccessful

Thank you."

in reducing the predictive distortions resulting from outcome information.
In a

more direct attempt to counter any motivational influences,

Fischhoff (1977) explicity warned subjects about the hindsight bias tendency.

The specific

instructions read:

On previous occasions in which we have given people this task, we
have found that they exaggerate how much they have known without
being told the answer. You might call this an I-knew-it-all-along
effect.
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Consider, for example, the following question. Adaptive radiation refers to (a) evolutionary changes in animal life toward
increased specialization or (b) the movement of animals to a more
suitable environment for survival. A group of people who were told
that the correct answer was (a) believed that they would have
assigned a probability of . 60 to (a). A group of people who were
not told the answer believed that the item was a toss-up. They
assigned a probability of .SO to (a). Another group of people who
were told that the correct answer was (a) believed that they would
have assigned a probability of .40 to (b), the incorrect answer.
Again, people who were not told the answer assigned a probability of
.50 to (b). As you can see, people who were told the answer to an
item assigned a higher probability to the correct answer or a lower
probability to the incorrect answer than they might have if they had
not been told the answer.
In completing the questionnaire, please do everything you can
to avoid this bias. One reason why it happens is that people who
are told the correct answer find it hard to imagine how they ever
could have believed in the incorrect one. In answering, make certain that you haven't forgotten any reasons that you might have
thought of in favor of the wrong answer - had you not been told that
it was wrong.
In addition to figuring out how the correct answer
fits in with whatever else you know about each topic, devote some
attention to trying to see how the incorrect answer might have fit
in.
At the other extreme, however, be careful not to overcorrect
and sell yourself short by underestimating how much you would have
known without the answer. (pp. 354-355)
After reading this warning, subjects were just as likely as other hindsightful observers who did not read the warning to overestimate their
predictive capabilities.
Still other motivationally-based explanations of hindsight bias
have been explored, such as the hypothesis that subjects retrospectively
claim better predictive capabilities to enhance their self-esteem or the
hypothesis that people distort their public predictions as a self-presentation strategy (Leary, 1981,1982).
While Leary found

Neither hypothesis was supported.

clear evidence of hindsight distortion, he found no

evidence of any apparent mediating effects of self-esteem or self-presentation factors.
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Experimental conditions have also been designed to test the relationship between

other self-presentation factors and hindsight bias.

For example, experimental tasks have been presented as memory exercises
rather than tests of general knowledge (Fischhoff, 1977; Fischhoff &
Beyth, 1975; Wood, 1978), assuming that subjects would feel less selfconscious about a poor memory than poor judgment.

Subjects have also

been asked to answer as foresightful peers would answer, on the assumption that there would be no particular motivation to overstate what
their peers would know (Fischhoff, 1975a; Wood, 1978).

Neither manipu-

lation reduced the hindsight effect.
Along with these attempts to detect motivational sources of hindsight bias, the possibility that the hindsight phenomenon resulted from
certain demand characteristic effects was also explored.

For instance,

Wood (1978) designed a series of experiments to assess a demand-characteristic interpretation of the effect.

Subjects, whether students or

surgeons, may consciously choose to use outcome information in an effort
to please the experimenter.
simply be too hard to ignore.

The "right" answer in prediction tasks may
Although it may be impossible to

elimi-

nate all demand- characteristic effects, Wood attempted to minimize
their influence by specifically encouraging subjects to recall their
foresightful predictions rather than reporting what seemed most likely
from the outcome. Despite this instruction, Wood found clear evidence of
hindsight bias.
Although neither motivational nor presentational interpretations
have been supported, there is the possibility that various experimental
artifacts might be contributing to the predictive distortions associated
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with outcome information.
series of

To investigate this possibility, there were a

studies varying certain task or situational factors.

None of

these efforts eliminated or reduced the bias. For instance, variations
in experimental context have not eliminated the effect. Hindsight bias
has been demonstrated with diverse experimental materials including historical events (Fischhoff, 1975a), psychotherapy case histories (Fischhoff, 1975a), facts of general knowledge (Wood, 1978), outcomes of scientific experiments (Slavic & Fischhoff, 1977) medical diagnoses (Arkes
et al. ,1981), and employment-related incidents (Mitchell & Kalb, 1981)
Variations in certain task factors have also failed to undo the
bias.

Fischhoff

(1982b) described

the following

range of

failed

attempts to manipulate task factors and thus reduce hindsight bias:
substituting rating-scale judgments of "surprisingness" for probability assessments (Slavic & Fischhoff, 1977); using more homogeneous items to allow fuller evocation of one set of knowledge, rather
than using general-knowledge questions scattered over a variety of
content areas, none of which might be thought about very deeply
(Fischhoff & Beyth, 1975);
trying to dispel doubts about the
nature of the experiment (Wood, 1978); using contemporary events
that judges have considered in foresight prior to making their hindsight judgments (Fischhoff & Beyth, 1975); ... separating subjects
in time from the report of the event, in hopes of reducing its tendency to dominate their perceptual field (Fischhoff & Beyth, 1975;
Wood, 1978); ... having subjects assess the likelihood of the
reported event's recurring rather than the likelihood of its happening in the first place, in the hope that uncertainty would be more
available in the forward- looking perspective (Mitchell & Kalb,
1981; Slavic & Fischhoff, 1977). (pp. 428-429)
Hindsight bias has appeared across still more diverse experimental
parameters, including conditions that contrast whether hindsight subjects perform hypothetical or straightforward judgments and whether the
antecedent events are presented in greater or lesser detail (Slovic &
Fischhoff, 1977).

Hindsight bias also withstood variations in instruc-
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tional sets, conditions with and without preoutcome judgments, and conditions with different statement sets (Wood, 1978).
Given the numerous

failed attempts to minimize hindsight bias,

other research efforts were directed at learning more about the cognitive factors associated with the bias.
have been

found to be susceptible

(Casscells, Schoenberger,

& Graboys,

For example, although experts

to cognitive biases in
1978; Chapman

& Chapman,

judgment
1982; Det-

mer et al., 1978;Eddy,1982; Oskamp, 1982), it was thought that hindsight
bias might be minimized,if not reduced, by expertise or intense involvement with a topic.

For instance Arkes et al.(1981) predicted that sub-

jects making predictions

from a more established knowledge base would

be less susceptible to hindsight bias than those asked to make predictions from positions of relative ignorance.

However, studies that

used experimental materials derived from subjects' particular experience
or expertise do not

reveal any expert

immunity.

Researchers

have

uncovered hindsight bias with surgeons evaluating an episode involving a
possible leaking abdominal aortic aneurism (Detmer, Fryback,

& Gassner,

1978), with physicians judging clinical assessments of a bartender with
acute knee pain (Arkes et al., 1981), and with nurses evaluating outcomes related to subordinants' work peformance (Mitchell
The possibility was

also rasied that

& Kalb,

1981).

cognitive limitations of

foresight were confounding the hindsight- foresight differential.
explained by Slavic and Fischhoff (1977),

As

it may be that the hindsight

bias reflects foresight subjects' inability to see how things will look
in the future as well as hindsight subjects' inability to recapture the
uncertainties of the past.

However, experiments designed to improve the
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performance of the foresight subjects failed to reduce the difference
between foresight and hindsight subjects (Slavic & Fischhoff, 1977).
Given the robustness of the hindsight effect, Fischhoff (1977)
proposed that our vulnerability to hindsight bias
automatic assimilation of new and old information.

results

from an

That is, he argued

that we tend to make sense of outcome information by immediately integrating it into what we already know about the given subject.

Having

made this reinterpretation, the reported outcome now seems an inevitable
outgrowth of the reinterpreted situation.

Even when trying to recon-

struct our foresightful state of mind, we remain "anchored" in our hindsightful perspective, resulting in the reported outcome appearing more
probable than before.

Further, we may be so anchored in our present

perspective that the previous cognitive state is beyond retrieval.

Once

we know what has happened and have adjusted our perceptions accordingly,
we may find it difficult at best to imagine how things could have turned
out otherwise.
This interpretation is consistent with research on cognitive processes in memory that found that our memory of the past was not a memory
of the uncertainties of the past.

Rather, it appeared as a reconstruc-

tion of past events in terms of what occurred or what we are told or
remember to have occurred.

Evidence for the reconstructive processes of

memory were reported in prose recall (Pichert & Anderson, 1977; Anderson

& Pichert, 1978; Spiro, 1980), as well as in the context of eyewitness
testimony (Loftus, 1975,1979,1980; Loftus & Loftus, 1980).
Extending his original proposition, Fischhoff (1977)
that hindsight bias might

suggested

represent a specific instance of a more gen-
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eral inability to disregard information that has already been processed.
This more genera 1 phenomenon has been documented with a variety of
information, including inadmissible evidence in court (Sue,
Caldwell, 1973),

Smith, &

tests of general knowledge (Fischhoff, 1977),

experi-

mental debriefing instructions (Ross, Lepper, & Hubbard, 1975), person
descriptions (Wyer & Unverzagt, 1985), and scenarios of aggression followed by information of mitigating circumstances
1976). Yet, this

latter proposition

research on judgment and memory.

(Zillman & Cantor,

has not been supported by

For example, Ross et al.

other

(1975)

reported that "process debriefing" was generally successful in correcting biased predictions.

Their manipulation provided explicit discussion

of the perseverance dynamic, which is defined as the tendency to retain
beliefs even after the original supporting evidence was discredited.

In

a study of memory, Hasher and Griffin (1978) found that subjects' recall
also depended on certain experimental factors. Depending on the demands
made on the subjects when retention was tested, subjects were able to
disregard prior information.
More insight into the cognitive dynamics of hindsight bias was
gained when researchers at last discovered a way to reduce the predictive distortions associated with outcome information.
the one strategy

Specifically.

that has been effective at reducing hindsight bias

required subjects to provide rationales for alternative outcomes.

Sla-

vic and Fischhoff (1977) proposed that outcome information may eliminate
the need to consider alternative scenarios. In this sense, it functions
as a heuristic or simplication strategy.

Thus, if subjects are asked to

consider the possibility of other outcomes,

they may become less
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"anchored" in the hindsightful perspective.

When asked to play devil's

advocate, that is to argue for the occurrence of outcomes that did not
occur, the perceived inevitability of the reported outcome was in fact
diminished (horiat, Lichtenstein, & Fischhoff, 1980;Slovic & Fischhoff,
1977).
Playing devil's advocate, or the consider-the-opposite strategy
(Lord, Lepper, & Preston, 1984), has proven successful in other attempts
to overcome judgmental bias.

For instance, the phenomenon of belief

perseverance, defined as the tendency to retain beliefs even after the
original supporting evidence has been invalidated (Ross et al., 1975),
has been tempered by requiring subjects to provide causal explanations
for alternative positions

(Anderson, 1982; Anderson, Lepper, & Ross,

1980;Ross, et al., 1975).

Lord, Lepper and Preston (1984) applied the

strategy successfully to the biased assimilation of new evidence,
defined as the tendency to interpret evidence in a way that supports
initial beliefs (Lord, Ross, & Lepper, 1979), and to a related phenomenon, biased hypothesis-testing (Snyder & Swann, 1978).
sight bias, the consider-the-opposite strategy was

As with hind-

effective at

" cor-

recting" judgment in both these domains whereas explicit instructions to
be fair and unbiased failed.
The success of the explanation task at reducing the bias suggests
that it is not the outcome information per se that produces changes in
likelihood estimates.
jects

Rather, it is the explanatory framework that sub-

develop in hindsight that produces a sense of outcome inevitabil-

ity (Ross et al., 1975; Ross, Lepper, Strack, & Steinmetz, 1977).

Even

after an outcome or belief has been discredited, subjects may retain a
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salient cognitive schema that still supports the initial conclusion.
Only i•hen subjects

are specifically asked to

generate alternative

rationales do they relinquish their cognitive attachment to the original
pespective.

Support for this view can be found in a series of experi-

ments specifically designed to relate the influence of causal schemas to
probabilistic predictions.

Ross, Lepper, Strack, and Steinmetz (1977)

found that providing an explanation for a clinical outcome increased its
perceived likelihood.

This was true even when subjects were told that

the outcomes were hypothetical.

Ross et al. concluded:

"Having gener-

ated a plausible account for suggesting how a particular event might
have been predicted from knowledge of a patient's prior history,

sub-

jects appeared consistently willing to make the inferential leap from
possibility to probability" (p. 826).
Thus, the process of explaining an outcome's occurrence may represent the critical
judgment.

cognitive activity that produces biased predictive

Other researchers have acknowedged the relationship between

hindsight and causal schemas.

For example, Hogarth (1980) noted that

hindsight invites us to impose a causal structure on a
events.

~ith

the outcome as a starting point, one can believe any cau-

sal sequence that seems plausible.
foresight

sequence of

In contrast, Hogarth noted that

requires "considerable powers of

imagination and both the

ability and willingness to entertain several hypotheses simultaneously"
(p .102).

Thus,

hindsight bias might be the unfortunate

result of

"thinking backward" (Fischhoff, 1975b).

A possible link between

hindsight and the tendency to "think

backward" was suggested by the results of a famous experiment designed
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to examine the clinical insights of mental health workers.
han (1973) and colleagues each

gained admission to a

by complaining of audible hallucinations.

David Rosen-

mental hospital

Once admitted, the researhers

told the staff only the truth about their life histories and emotional
states.

However, each was diagnosed as schizophrenic and later dis-

charged with the diagnosis "schizophrenia in remission." Rosenhan
reported one example of how information was distorted by a staff member
in order to achieve consistency with the diagnosis of schizophrenia.
Specifically, one of the study confederates had revealed that he:
had a close relationship with his mother but was rather remote from
his father during his early childhood.
During adolescence and
beyond, however, his father became a close friend, while his relationship with his mother cooled. His present relationship with his
wife was characteristically close and warm. Apart from occasional
angry exchanges, friction was minimal. The children had rarely been
spanked. (p.253)
The clinical interpretation that was formally documented read:
This white 39-year-old male ... manifests a long history of considerable ambivalence in close relationships, which begins in early childhood. A warm relationship with his mother cools during adolescence.
A distant relationship to his father is described as becoming very
intense. Affective stability is absent. His attempts to control
emotionality with his wife and children are punctuated by angry outbursts and, in the case of the children, spankings. And while he
says that he has several good friends, one senses considerable ambivalence embedded in those relationships also. (p.253)
People's attraction to explanations or causal schemas has been
extensively documented from several perspectives. For instance,

its

existence is well documented in judgment and memory tasks (Ajzen, 1977;
Anderson, Lepper, & Ross, 1980; Fiedler, 1982; Fiske & Linville, 1980;
Hastie, 1981; Markus & Zajonc, 1985; Ross, Lepper, Strack, & Steinmetz,
1977; Taylor & Crocker, 1981;Wyer & Gordon, 1982).

The relationship
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between causal reasoning and predictive judgment has also been the subject of much of the attribution research (Ross,
son, 1982; Ross & Fletcher, 1985).

1977 ;Ross & Ander-

In a review of the research on causal

reasoning, Tversky and Kahneman (1982c) noted that earlier research has
provided a "compelling demonstration of the irresistible tendency to
perceive sequences of events in terms of causal relations, even when the
perceiver is fully aware that the relationship between events is incidental and that the imputed causality is illusory" (p. 117).

Further,

they concluded that it is now ''a psychological commonplace that people
strive to achieve a coherent interpretation of the events that surround
them, and that the organization of events by schemas of cause-effect
relations serves to achieve this goal" (p. 117).

Other research on judg-

ment under uncertainty has further illustrated our cognitive drive for
order even to the extent that people have been found to seek order and
meaning in

random events such as

flipping a fair coin (Lindman &

Edwards, 1961).
From an in-depth analysis of one possible manifestation of the
drive for cognitive order, specifically, hindsight bias, we know that
outcome information biases our predictive judgment, that we are largely
unaware of being outcome-dependent, and that we are unable to transcend
the bias except when specifically requested to generate rationales for
alternative outcomes.

However, we know very

little

about some of the

practical implications associated with hindsight bias.

A critical

real-world implication of hindsight bias pertains to hindsightful evaluations, a phenomenon more commonly called second-guessing.

Given what

research has already uncovered, there is good reason to suspect the use
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of hindsight as a valid or cognitively uncontaminated gauge of foresight.
Implications for Second-Guessing
In

his early studies of hindsight bias, Fischhoff (1975a,1975b)

acknowledged the implications that hindsight bias held for the objectivity of second-guessing.
Misfortunes bring out the Monday-morning quarterback in us all.
When things go badly, we tend to look for a culprit to blame; then,
once we find one, we second-guess him, wondering how he could have
been so foolish.
Looking back, we feel imbued with that special
wisdom born of hindsight.
Historical examples abound, Pearl Harbor, the Bay of Pigs,
Vietnam, Watergate - all of these once-future events seem now to be
the inevitable result of stupid mistakes in judgment. Many of us
feel that had we been in a position to influence matters, we would
have made decisions more sagaciously than did those in power. But
would we? (p.71)
Because of our second-guessing tendencies, which may be particularly aroused following an unfortunate event, Fischhoff (1975a) tested
whether subjects, who were informed of the outcome to an event, could
reconstruct the perceptions of people who did not have access to outcome
information.

In the experiment, both hindsight subjects, who were told

that a particular outcome had occurred, and control subjects, who were
given no outcome information,were instructed to "guess" the judgments of
students of social science in other universities regarding the likelihood of certain outcomes and the significance of certain antecedent
events.

Fischhoff found that the hindsight subjects attributed more

clairvoyant predictions to students in other universities than did control subjects. Further, hindsight subjects were more likely than control
subjects to expect other students to recognize the significance of cer-
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tain antecedent events that only

the benefit of hindsight allowed them

to see.
Thus, there is some

evidence that the difficulty we have in rec-

reating a foresightful perspective for ourselves is paralleled by what
Fischhoff (1975a) called " a failure to empathize with outcome-ignorant
others"

(p. 295).

However, there are three important questions to

address before the connection between outcome information and
second-guessing can be confidently drawn.

biased

First, the fairness of sec-

ond-guessing is predicated on the notion that we can see how a situation
appeared to others, that is, before the outcome was known.

In order to

generalize hindsight bias to the second-guessing process, we
directly test whether

hindsight subjects

need to

presume predictive superior-

ity to that of a decision-maker who, like many decision-makers in real
life, was not appraised in advance of the outcome to an uncertain situation.
A second

critical question remains regarding the relationship

between hindsight bias and judgments of others' decision.

Specifically,

does hindsight bias systematically distort evaluative judgment as it has
been found to distort predictive judgment?

That is, do we believe that

we would have foreseen the likelihood of an unfortunate event (prediction), and consequently, felt that the original decision-maker should
have foreseen what was only apparent to us in hindsight (evaluation)?
Prior research has shown that attributions of responsibility are associated with the belief that the consequences of certain decisions were
foreseeable (Chaiken & Darley, 1973; Finchum & Jaspers, 1980; Heider,
1958; Shaw & Shulzer, 1964; Walster, 1966).

Thus, it is important to
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investigate whether

access to outcome information undermines the objec-

tivity of hindsightful evaluations of others' decisions.
Finally, as Fischhoff (1975b) described, our second-guessing tendencies seem most exaggerated when a misfortunate event occurs.

Prior

research has demonstrated that the more serious the outcome of an event,
the more responsibility is attributed to the perpetrator (Arkkelin, Oakley, & Mynatt, 1979; Chaiken & Darley, 1973; Walster, 1966). Although
this finding has not always been replicated (Mitchell & Kalb, 1981; Walster, 1967), the gravity of the judgmental error represents a important
contextual

factor associated with second-guessing others.

It is impor-

tant to determine whether or not the context of second-guessing exaggerates any predictive or evaluative distortions found with outcome information alone.
An Experimental Investigation of Second-Guessing
Because the connection between hindsight bias and the objectivity
of second-guessing others has crucial implications for understanding how
we can fairly evaluate and learn from the decisions of others, the present study was designed to explore the answers to three questions.
First, this study was designed to test whether the predictive distortions already associated with outcome information generalize to a context that includes another person's judgment.

Unlike prior studies of

hindsight, subjects in the present study were informed of an

expert's

assessment of a case that they were also asked to assess. Specifically,
subjects read clinical case histories that included an expert recommendation along with the patient information.

The outcome information
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included at the end of the case history
or not support the expert assessment.

was designed to either support
Based on prior evidence of peo-

ple's distorted impressions of their predictive prowess, it was first
hypothesized that subjects who received outcome information that contradicted

an expert opinion would overestimate what they would have fore-

seen without the benefit of hindsight. Specifically, it was expected
that these subjects would report significantly

le~s

predictive agree-

ment with the expert than subjects who received either favorable or no
outcome information.
The second major question this study regarded whether or not outcome information systematically biases the evaluations of another's
judgment as it has been found to bias subjective predictive judgment.
Based on prior evidence of people's inability to reconstruct the foresight of others (Fischhoff, 1975a), it was hypothesized that subjects
who read of an outcome that contradicted the expert judgment would evaluate the expert judgment more harshly than subjects who received either
favorable or no outcome information.
The third major question of the present study regareded whether or
not a particular contextual factor, specifically the
ing someone as a result of a misfortunate or
strengthen the bias.

consequences fac-

unfavorable outcome, would

It was expected that the subjects in this study

who received information pertaining to a pending malpractice suit filed
against the expert would exhibit significantly less predictive agreement
with the expert and assign significantly less favorable evaluation ratings to the expert judgment than would subjects who read only of an
unfavorable outcome.
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Results from this study have both theoretical and practical importance.

In order to broaden our understanding of how hindsight bias

operates, we need to know more about when and where it occurs.
from this study

Results

show whether hindsight bias generalizes to situations

involving another decision-maker and whether the bias has a predictable
influence on the hindsightful evaluations

of that decision-maker.

Fur-

ther, these results will show whether the context of hindsightful evaluations, specifically the mention of a formal investigation of the decision-maker's

judgment,

exaggerates

distortions associated with outcome

the

predictive

information.

and

evaluative

These findings have

critical implications in many practical settings, most notably, those
associated with our legal system of evaluating the judgments of others.
Not only is the tendency to second-guess others at the heart of many of
our ethical and moral judgments but our system of due process is largely
based on the hindsight of some to judge the foresight of others.
Before reviewing the findings from the present study, it is important to acknowledge that the manifestation of hindsight bias being
investigated in this study may be more subtle than
prior hindsight research.

that investigated by

When an individual's prediction does not

eventuate, there may be human judgmental fault involved.
fact

that the prediction did not bear true

indictment of the judgment.

Rather,

However, the

is not the appropriate

the appropriate criteria for an

objective evaluation of an earlier decision include

the review and use

of only the information that was available at the time the decision was
made.

Although hindsight might contradict an earlier decision,

the

actual decision or judgment may have been emminently reasonable given
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t was known.

h
~-~hether

The major purpose of this study was to investigate

second-guessers fall prey to hindsight bias, that is, evaluate a

decision-maker on the basis of what

became apparent only

in hindsight.

CHAPTER II

METHOD
Subjects
One hundred and sixty introductory psychology students from Loyola
University of Chicago participated in this study in partial fulfillment
of a course requirement. Forty subjects were randomly assigned to one of
four experimental conditions.

Although subjects completed the materials

in small groups, discussion of the study or of the materials was disallowed during the sessions.
Experimental Materials
The experimental materials used in this study included two authentic psychotherapy case histories of approximately 3, 000 words,

each

taken from a clinical casebook by Goldstein and Palmer (1975).

(See

Appendix B.)

Because the object of the present study concerned judgment

rather than accuracy, clinical materials were chosen rather than passages from which there was a "right" answer.

To maintain consistency

with related research, two clinical cases were selected for use that
were previously used in a related study of outcome information and
social explanation (Ross, Lepper, Strack, & Steinmetz,

1977).

These

particular cases were selected because of their extensive descriptions
of the patient's background, formative experiences, and symptoms at the
time professional help was sought.
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As summarized below

by Ross et
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al. (1977), both cases provided an abundance of detailed and potentially
relevant material that subjects could use to evaluate expert clinical
judgment and the likelihood of subsequent events in the patient's life.
In one case, a young housewife, Shirley K., arrived at the clinic
complaining of frequent headaches and dizziness.
She expressed
great anxiety over her uncontrollable thoughts of harming her
2-year-old son and repugnance for her current husband.
Her history
included an early and unhappy marriage to escape a manipulating
mother and restrictive father, a subsequent liason with a musician
who fathered her son and eventually committed suicide, and a current, abhorrent marriage to a lawyer who was frequently unemployed
and unable to provide adequate support for his family. The report
further descibes Shirley's reactions to the suicide of her lover,
the death of her father, and the commitment of her mother to a mental institution.
In the other case, George P., a middle-aged bachelor, was seen
upon his readmission to a Veteran's Administration hospital suffering from stomach pains and a generalized weakness and malaise. His
history included an early separation from his family, a period spent
as a hobo, a subsequent term of military service, involvement in a
number of unsuccessful business ventures, and his eventual return
home to care for his mother until her death.
The report also
described George's previous hospital admissions and health problems,
his potential difficulties with unadmitted alcoholism, and a recent
dispute which led George to resign from his last job as a food
machine servicman. ( p. 819)
Two

different

clinical case histories were

included to test

whether any of the findings from this study might be restricted to a
particular context.

These two cases were chosen because they involved

patients that differed on major dimensions such as gender,age,

family

background, and symptomotology.
The

section of each case history that summarized the patient's

recovery was not included in the study materials.
received fictitious

Instead, subjects

information about a clinical judgment and treatment

recommendation rendered by a staff clinical psychologist,as well as some
fictitious information about subsequent events in the patient's life.
The feasibility of all the fictitious

information was

reviewed by two
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members of the clinical faculty and two clinical graduate students from
the Psychology Department at Loyola Univesity of Chicago.

Subjects'

reactions to the case histories in general, and to the case endings in
particular, were explored during pilot testing.

Excluding the ficti-

tious information included at the end, George's case history was presented to subjects exactly as it appeared in the casebook.

However, due

to subjects' reactions during pilot-testing, Shirley's case material was
modified for use in this experiment.

Specifically, a majority of the

pilot subjects who read of Shirley's favorable response to treatment
perceived the likelihood of her recovery to be very small given her violent fantasies toward her son.

To provide a version that was more

believable to this subject population, the favorable ending written for
Shirley was used, but all mention of Shirley's violent thoughts towards
her son was excluded from the case history.
Design and Procedure
Upon their arrival, subjects were handed a packet of materials .
The first page of the packet was an introductory statement that briefed
subjects on the study's purpose and the nature of the tasks. (See Appendix A.)

Subjects were told that the study involved clinical judg-

ment,with the purpose of revealing how people like themselves judged
certain clinical situations,and that the study tasks included reading a
case history "much as it appears in an authentic clinical case textbook"
and answering certain questions.

The specific wording of the questions

varied according to which client, i.e., Shirley or George, that subjects
were assigned to
received.

evaluate and which outcome information subjects had

(See Appendix C for a complete listing of all questions.)

27

The experimental design is summarized in Table 1.

Subjects were

assigned according to a block randomized procedure to one of four outcome conditions. Sex and case were also balanced. Thus, each block comprised 16 combinations of gender, case, and outcome condition.
All subjects assigned to a case received the same statement of
clinical judgment and treatment recommendation.

In Shirley's case, sub-

jects read that the clinical psychologist assigned to the case, Dr. M.,
judged that Shirley's presenting physical symptoms,

specifically her

headaches and dizziness, were caused by emotional issues.

Dr. M. recom-

mended that Shirley immediately begin weekly outpatient psychotherapy to
work on her emotional issues.

All subjects who were assigned to read

George's case history read that Dr. M. judged George to be emotionally
capable of leaving the hospital.

Dr. M. also recommended that George

see a vocational counselor to be placed immediately in a suitable job
and that George begin weekly outpatient counseling to help him adjust to
leaving the hospital and functioning

in society.

The four outcome conditions reflected variation in the outcome
information included after the statement of clinical judgment and treatment recommendation.
Control Condition
Subjects assigned to this condition did not receive any patient
outcome information or mention of a malpractice suit.

Table 1
Study Design

Condition

Description

Case ffl: Shirley

Case 112: George

TOTAL

Control

No patient outcome information

10 Men
10 Women

10 Men
10 Women

40

Favorable

Favorable patient outcome
information

10 Men
10 Women

10 Men
10 Women

40

Unfavorable

Unfavorable patient outcome
information

10 Men
10 Women

10 Men
10 Women

40

Malpractice

Unfavorable patient outcome and
mention of a malpractice suit

10 Men
10 Women

10 Men
10 Women

40

80

80

TOTAL

160

N

00
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Favorable Condition
Subjects in this

condition received information of a favorable

patient outcome. The outcomes assigned to subjects in this condition
closely resembled the actual outcomes reported in the casebook.

The 20

subjects who were assigned to read Shirley's case history read that
Shirley followed the treatment recommendation and that her physical
symptoms did in fact disappear as she progressed in weekly outpatient
psychotherapy.

Subjects who read George's case history were informed

that the hospital discharge, placement in a new job and weekly counseling sessions helped greatly to build George's confidence and sense of
well-being. They read that George's physical symptoms subsided as he
became increasingly secure about functioning in society.

Unfavorable Condition
Subjects in this condition received fictitious outcome information
about the patient's unfavorable response to treatment. The 20 subjects
assigned to Shirley's case read that her physical symptoms worsened even
before beginning psychotherapy,and that after seeing a neurologist,
Shirley discovered that her headaches and dizziness were caused by a
growing cerebral tumor.

The case ending also stated that Shirley suf-

fered irreversible brain damage that may have been avoided had she
received medical attention right away.

The case ending designed for

Shirley was intended to illustrate an expert error in clinical judgment
based on the fact that Dr. M. 's prediction of the emotional basis of
Shirley's physical symptoms was not supported by subsequent events.

The

case ending was also intended to illustrate an expert protocol error
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based on the fact that Dr. M.

did not investigate possible physical

causes for the headaches and dizziness as a routine precautionary measure.

As a point of contrast, the unfavorable case ending designed for

George was intended to reflect
extent

of patient

a judgmental miscalculation of the

psychopathology.

Specifically,

the 20

subjects

assigned to read about George were told that he was immediately overwhelmed with anxiety upon leaving the hospital and was unable to see a
vocational counselor or to attend his counseling sessions.

Subjects

were told that George was subsequently re-admitted to the hospital after
a suicide attempt that left him with irreversible physical problems.
Malpractice Condition
Subjects in this condition received the same patient outcome
information as subjects in the unfavorable condition along with a statement about a $500,000 malpractice suit

filed against Dr. M.

In Shir-

ley's case, Dr. M. was being sued for not referring Shirley immediately
to a physician to check on her physical symptoms.

In George's case, Dr.

M. faced malpractice charges for not referring the patient immediately
to an inpatient psychiatric unit for more observation and help.
Manipulation Check
Because the study hypotheses pertained to the influence of outcome
information on predictive and evaluative judgment, a manipulation check
was administered to verify that subjects had attended to and retained
the particular outcome information included at the end of their case
history.

After subjects had completed and returned all study materials,

they were asked to check which of a series of outcomes they had read.
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To be included in the study, it was necessary for all subjects in the
favorable condition to indicate that "the patient had improved", for all
subjects assigned to Shirley's case in either the unfavorable or malpractice condition to indicate that "the patient was diagnosed by a physician as having a tumor'', for all subjects assigned to George's case in
either the unfavorable or malpractice condition to indicate that "the
patient had attempted suicide",

for all control subjects to indicate

that "there was no information about any of the above outcomes happen-

. "
1ng.
As a result of the manipulation check, 12 subjects, 8 men and 4
women, were excluded from the study.

The unfavorable condition involv-

ing Shirley's case history emerged as

more problematic in terms of sub-

jects' attention to outcome; 10 of the 12 excluded subjects had been
assigned to read this

version of the patient outcome.

Eight of these

10 subjects indicated on the manipulation check that no outcome information was available.

It is interesting to note that, even though

sub-

jects in the malpractice condition also received the same outcome information, none of these subjects

failed the manipulation check.

It may

be that the mention of the malpractice suit heightened the salience of
the outcome information.
Dependent Measures
Predictive Judgment
Subjects were required to make a series of predictions regarding
the likelihood of various patient-related outcomes.
questions were presented as foresightful predictions.

All

likelihood

That is, before

making the first prediction, all subjects were instructed as follows:
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Assume that you are a clinical psychologist and Shirley (George)
went to see you instead of Dr. M. Assume that you just completed
the interview with Shirley (George) wherein information about her
(his) background, formative experiences, and current complaints was
discussed ... Remember that you just met with Shirley (George).
Similar instructions were repeated before all subsequent likelihood
questions.
Subjects were asked to predict events that pertained to: (a) the
validity of a clinical assessment; (b) the appropriateness of a treatment recommendation;

and (c)

response to the treatment.

the likelihood of a specific patient

First, subjects rated the chances that Dr.

M. 's clinical assessment of the patient would bear true.

Those assigned

to Shirley's case were asked to predict the chances that Shirley's symptoms "are" or "are not" caused by emotional issues.

(These items were

worded to represent foresightful predictions and subjects evaluated the
two mutually exclusive event possibilities).
case were asked to predict

Those assigned to George's

. " or "is not"
the chances that George " l.S

emotionally capable of leaving the hospital.
Next, subjects were asked to predict whether Dr.

M. 's treatment

recommendation would prove to be appropriate for the patient.

In Shir-

ley's case, subjects were asked to predict the chances that weekly outpatient psychotherapy "is" or "is not" appropriate treatment for Shirley.

Subjects assigned to read George's case history predicted the

chances that a hospital discharge, a suitable job, and weekly counseling
"is" or "is not" appropriate treatment for George.

Although the ques-

tions for both Shirley and George subjects addressed Dr. M. 's treatment
recommendation, the content of the questions was differentially complex
for Shirley and George subjects.

In particular, the treatment recommen-
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dation for George involved three parts (hospital discharge, a suitable
job, and weekly counseling) as opposed to the one treatment element
recommended for Shirley (weekly outpatient therapy).
The final likelihood question required that subjects across the
four outcome conditions predict the chances that two mutually exclusive
patient outcomes would occur.

One outcome summarized the patient

responding favorably to the recommended treatment; the other outcome
described the patient responding unfavorably to the recommended treatment.

For Shirley, the two outcomes were summarized as follows:

Shirley will learn in therapy to talk more openly about her feelings
about past and current relationships. As she progresses in therapy,
her physical symptoms will disappear and her relationships with her
husband and son will improve.
Before beginning therapy, Shirley's physical symptoms will worsen.
Shirley will see a physician and discover that her physical symptoms
are caused by a physical condition.

For George, the favorable and unfavorable outcomes were summarized as
follows:
The new job and the weekly counseling sessions will help greatly to
build George's confidence and sense of well-being. George will
become increasingly secure about functioning in society and his
physical symptoms will subside.
Immediately after being discharged from the hospital, George will
become overwhelmed with anxiety. George will be unable to leave his
apartment and will attempt suicide.
All likelihood questions were formatted comparably to those in
prior investigations of hindsight bias.

That is, subjects were asked to

assign "forced-sum" probability estimates (estimates that sum to 100~~)
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to mutually exclusive events.

Although hindsight bias has been shown to

withstand diverse question formats

(Fischhoff,

1982b), the difference

between forced-sum a~d open-ended probability estimates has not been
analyzed.

Therefore,

to explore whether open-ended estimates would

yield different results, subjects were asked to generate both forced-sum
and open-ended predictions for questions pertaining to the likelihood of
a specific patient reponse.

Procedurally, the open-ended estimates were

required before the forced-sum estimates.

Subjects were requested to

first assign a single probability to the favorable patient outcome without any mention of an alternative ending or of forced-summing.

Next

subjects were asked to assign another open-ended probability to the
unfavorable patient outcome.

Finally, subjects were presented with both

patient outcomes and asked to assign forced-sum estimates.
For the open-ended estimates, all subjects were

presented with a

visual display of percentages that ascended from 0% to 100% in increments of 10.
Occurring" ;

Two values were labeled:
100~~ was labeled as

O~~ was labeled as "No Chance Of

"Certain of Occurring."

Subjects were

asked to circle one of the 11 percentages that best represented the
chances that the favorable outcome would occur,

Given some known diffi-

culties with unanchored probability estimates (Hogarth, 1981), a visual
display with only 11 values was included to help structure
ended probability question. Although this modificatitm
tated the

subjects'

task,

an open-

may have facili-

this meant that the range of appropriate

responses for the open-ended probability estimates was not identical to
the range accepted for the forced-sum estimate.

35
All

likelihood questions were based on two mutually exclusive

alternatives.

For instance, the first likelihood measure represented

the perceived chances of making the same clinical assessment as Dr. M.
The alternative measure represented the perceived chances of not making
the same clinical assessment.

It should be noted that the study hypoth-

eses were framed to reflect the power of outcome information to decrease
the perceived likelihood of events and to decrease the perceived favorableness of another's judgment.

Thus, the dependent measures selected

for discussion pertain only to estimates of agreement with Dr. M.

For

instance, the first likelihood measure represented the perceived chances
of making the same clinical assessment as Dr. M.

Similarly, the other

prediction measures presented here correspond to the perceived likelihood of recommending the same treatment plan as Dr. M. and the perceived
likelihood of a favorable patient outcome that Dr. M. predicted based on
the clinical assessment and treatment plan.
As discussed by Winer (1971), proportion data involve predictable
departures from normality.

To correct for this artifact,

an arcs in

transformation was calculated for each of the probability measures
(Winer, 1971).

Although the transformed measures provide a "cleaner"

picture of the data, the units of measurement from the transformed measures are less familiar than percentage units.

Thus, for presentation

purposes, the untransformed responses, specifically, subjects percentage
predictions, are reported.
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Evaluative Judgment
A major goal of this study was to investigate evidence of the
hindsight effect in evaluative judgment.
for each subject to represent a

A global

index was calculated

general evaluation rating of Dr. M.

This index was the average response to four different rating questions.
The index for one subject, who failed to respond to the final index
item, was based on the average response to three and not four items.
Cronbach's Alpha test for internal consistency revealed high inter-item
reliability (Alpha= .87).
Three of the rating questions included in the index involved evaluating

Dr. M. 's judgment on a six point Likert scale that ranged from

labeled values 1,2,and 3,signifying very poor, poor, or slightly poor
judgment,respectively, through values 4,5,and 6, signifying slightly
good, good, and very good judgment.

Subjects were asked to use this

scale to rate: "the quality of Dr. M. 's overall clinical judgment;"

Dr.

M. 's judgment either that "Shirley's symptoms were caused by emotional
issues" or that "George was emotionally capable of leaving the hospital;" and Dr. M. 's treatment recommendation that either "Shirley begin
weekly outpatient psychotherapy to work on her emotional issues" or that
"George be discharged from the hospital, that he see a vocational counselor to be placed in a suitable job, and that he begin weekly outpatient counseling to help with the adjustment."
The final evaluation question used in the index required subjects
to use a six point Likert scale to indicate their level of agreement
with the statement:

"Dr. M. made an appropriate recommendation."

• values were anchored from "d 1sagree
'
six
strong 1y II to

II

The

agree strongly. II
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Along with the

index items, other evaluative questions were

included on the questionnaire to explore the relationship between outcome information

and other types of evaluative perceptions.

For

instance, subjects were asked to use the same six point Likert agreement
scale described above to indicate their level of agreement with statements that summarized

some common points of dispute between foresight-

ful and hindsightful decision-makers.

The statements, tailored to this

context,included:
1.

Shirley (George) represented a difficult case for any clinical
psychologist.

2.

There was not enough information about Shirley (George) for
Dr. M. to make an appropriate recommendation.

3.

Dr. M. should have discussed the case with other professionals.

4.

No matter what,

(1)

Shirley's physical symptoms should have

been checked out by a physician; or (2) George should have
been kept in the hospital for more emotional help.

Another major issue associated with hindsightful evaluations is
the issue of blame.

Attributions of blame have been associated with the

belief that the consequences of certain decisions and actions were foreseeable (Chaiken & Darley, 1973; Fincham & Jaspers, 1980; Heider, 1958;
Shaw & Sulzer, 1964; Walster, 1966).

To begin investigating the rela-

tionship between outcome information and attributions of blame, subjects
were asked to distribute forced-sum proportions of blame for the unfavorable patient outcome to Dr. M. and to the patient.
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A final evaluation question involved ranking Dr. M. 's treatment
recommendation from "least preferred" to "most preferred" from among
four other treatment alternatives.

For both cases, one alternative

referred to arranging for more information from the patient before making a definitive recommendation and another alternative referred to
meeting with other professionals to discuss the case before making a
definitive recommendation.

These options were included to assess two of

the more common hindsightful observations, namely, that more information
or more collaboration was needed.
The other two alternatives that subjects were asked to rank were
designed to represent treatment plans that, when compared to Dr. M. 's
recommendation, represented either a slightly more cautious approach or
a much more cautious approach.

More conservative alternatives were

included because of the informally observed tendency for hindsightful
evaluators to say: "You should have been more careful."

In Shirley's

case, the slightly more cautious recommendation advised Shirley to begin
weekly psychotherapy and see a physician if her physical problems continue. (In Dr. M.'s treatment plan, there was no mention of a possible
need for medical intervention.)

The even more cautious

involved advising Shirley to see a physician right away.

approach
In George's

case, the slightly more cautious approach involved a hospital discharge
and placement in a halfway house for men as a transition to living and
working on his own.

The even more conservative plan involved referring

Geroge immediately to the psychiatric unit of the hospital.
The results of analyses using all of the above dependent measures
are summarized in the next chapter.

CHAPTER III

RESULTS
Hindsight Bias and Predictive Judgment
Overview
The dependent measures selected to test the influence of outcome
information on predictive judgment were subjects' forced-sum estimates
of:

(a) the chances of making the same clinical assessment as Dr. M.;

(b) the chances of recommending the same treatment plan as Dr. M.; (c)
the chances of a favorable patient response given the
ment and treatment plan

recommended by Dr. M.

clinical assess-

Before testing the

influence of specific outcome information on each dependent measure,
univariate analyses of variance were conducted to confirm the presence
of an overall effect of outcome information across the four outcome conditions.

Once the overall effect was found, analytical comparisons were

conducted to test two hypotheses.
unfavorable

outcome

The first hypothesis stated that

information would diminish

assigned to each dependent prediction measure.

the

probabilities

Specifically, the expec-

tation was that subjects in the unfavorable condition would assign significantly lower probabilities to each of the three prediction measures
than subjects in either the favorable or control condition.
hypothesis stated that

The second

information regarding a malpractice suit filed

against the expert Dr. M.

would exaggerate the effect of outcome infor-

mation suggested by the first hypothesis.
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Specifically, the expectation
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was that subjects in the malpractice condition would assign significantly lower probabilities to the three dependent prediction measures
than subjects in the unfavorable condition.

For these and all subse-

quent analyses, the .05 level of statistical significance was applied.
Before pursuing the univariate analyses of variance, correlations
among the three forced-sum estimates were examined.

Moderate correla-

tions were found among all three likelihood estimates.

The correlation

between estimates pertaining to the clinical assessment and treatment
recommendation was .63.

The correlation between estimates of the clini-

cal assessment and favorable patient outcome was .53.

Finally, the cor-

relation between estimates of the treatment plan and favorable patient
outcome was

.55. Because none of these correlations were so high as to

suggest that the three

estimates reflected a single prediction, univar-

iate analyses of variance and analytical comparisons were conducted to
test the study hypotheses for each of the three prediction measures: the
clinical assessment, the treatment plan, and the outcome scenario.

The Clinical Assessment
Concerning the first prediction, the perceived chances of making
the same clinical assessment as Dr. M, Table 2 shows that significant
mean differences were found
(3,155)=11.25.

as

a

function of outcome condition,

As can be seen in Table 2, there was little

E

difference

in the average probability estimates between subjects in the unfavorable
and the

malpractice conditions.

There was also a minimal

difference

in the average probability estimates between subjects in the favorable
and control conditions.

However, subjects who received unfavorable
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patient outcome information,

in either the unfavorable or malpractice

conditions, were different in their predictions than subjects in
favorable and control conditions.
rable

outcome

information

the

Table 2 shows that receiving unfavo-

diminished subjects'

perceptions of

the

chances of making the same clinical assessment as Dr. M.
Along with an overall group effect, there was an overall effect
for case.

Subjects assigned to read Shirley's case history gave higher

probability estimates for this item than subjects assigned to read about
George

(72.0~~

versus

54.0~~.

respectively),

£:

(1,143)=30.57.

Closer

examination of the cell means revealed that the case differential was
most pronounced for subjects who received unfavorable patient outcome
information in either the unfavorable or malpractice conditions.

Shir-

ley subjects in the unfavorable condition assigned considerably higher
probabilities to the chances of making the same clinical assessment as
Dr. M. than George subjects in the unfavorable condition (64.6% versus
37.0%, respectively). Further, Shirley subjects in the malpractice condition

assigned higher estimates to this item than George subjects in

the malpractice condition (67. O'Jo versus 43. 4~~.

respectively).

Thus,

Shirley's unfavorable ending generated higher estimates of this prediction than did
history.

the unfavorable patient ending added to George's case

Table 2
Subject Predictions as a Function of Outcome Condition

Subject Predictions

Control

Favorable

Unfavorable

Mean

72.1%

74.5%

50.8%

55.2%

SD

19.6

14.7

26.6

26.0

Mean

73.8%

75.1%

48.2%

63.6%

SD

15.9

16.9

24.6

23.3

Mean

74.7%

79.8%

50.0%

55.0%

SD

13.6

12.6

21.8

25.l

Malpractice

N*

F

df

159

11. 25

(3,155)

<.05

160

14.67

(3,156)

<.05

160

23.60

(3,156)

<.05

1. Chances of subject making
the same clinical assessment as the expert, Dr. M.

2. Chances of subject
recommending the same
treatment plan as the
expert, Dr. M.

3. Chances of a favorable
patient outcome given the
clinical assessment and
treatment plan of the
expert, Dr. M.

*One subject failed to respond to the first prediction item.
**Statistically significant, Cochrans C = .43, E. <.05

~

N
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Table 2 also presents the standard deviations associated with each
Although statistically nonsignificant, Cochrans C

outcome condition.

=.36, E <.l, there was a trend for subjects in both the unfavorable and
malpractice conditions to be more variable in their responses than subjects in the favorable and control conditions. Specifically,a comparison
of the average standard deviations reveals that subjects in the favorable and malpractice conditions were approximately

75~

more variable in

their responses than subjects in the favorable condition and approximately

33~

more variable in their responses than subjects in the control

condition.

Thus,

as compared to the favorable patient outcome, the

unfavorable patient outcome tended to produce an extended range of subject responses as well to have significantly diminished values of the
subject predictions.
Having found significant mean differences across all outcome conditions, a series of analytical comparisons were conducted to test the
specific hypotheses.

The first hypothesis, specifically, that unfavora-

ble patient outcome information would decrease predictive agreement with
the expert, was confirmed with this dependent measure.

Subjects in in

the unfavorable condition considered it more unlikely that they would
make the same clinical assessment as Dr M.
favorable condition,

£

(1,155)=21.90.

than did subjects in the

Further, subjects in the unfavo-

rable condition perceived making the same clinical assessment as more
unlikely

than the control subjects, who had received no patient outcome

information,

£

(1,155)=18.15.

There was no significant difference

between control subjects and those who received favorable outcome information on this item.

The case factor did not influence the overall sig-

nificance or the overall pattern of the above results.
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A further major study hypothesis stated that hindsight bias would
be exaggerated as a function of
suit.

information regarding a malpractice

Specifically, the expectation was that subjects in the malprac-

tice condition would report

significantly less predictive agreement

with the expert than subjects

in the unfavorable condition.

hypothesis was not supported by these prediction data.

This

As can be seen

in Table 2, subjects in the malpractice condition did not consider the
chances of making the same clinical assessment as Dr. M. to be smaller
than subjects in the unfavorable condition.

These results were also

unaffected by the case factor.

The Treatment Recommendation
The second dependent prediction measure pertained to the perceived
chances of recommending the same treatment plan as Dr. M.
Table 2,significant

As seen in

mean differences were found as a function of out-

come condition for this measure,

£

(3,156)=14.67.

Overall, subjects in

the unfavorable and malpractice conditions gave less comparable responses than they did on the first measure (48.2% and 63.6%,respectively).
However, subjects in the unfavorable and malpractice conditions assigned
lower probabilities to the chances of recommending Dr. M. 's treatment
plan than subjects in either the favorable or control conditions.

A

similar trend with respect to within group variability is also shown in
Table 2.

Although statistically nonsignificant, Cochrans

~

=.36, E <.1,

there was a trend for subjects in the unfavorable and malpractice conditions to to be more variable in their responses to this measure than
subjects in the control and favorable conditions.

Thus, as with the
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first prediction item, unfavorable patient outcome information appeared
to have extended the range of subject responses as well as to significantly diminish the

value of subject responses for this item.

Along with an overall group effect, there was a significant case
effect found with the second prediction measure,
with the first prediction measure,

£

(1,144)=8.10.

As

Shirley subjects assigned higher

probabilities to this item than George subjects (69.9% versus 60.75%,
respectively).

Closer examination of the cell means revealed that the

mean difference in predictions was largest between subjects in the unfavorable and malpractice conditions.

Specifically, Shirley subjects in

the unfavorable condition assigned higher probabilities to the chances
of making the same treatment recommendation as Dr. M. than George subjects in the unfavorable condition (56.8% versus 39.8%, respectively).
Similarly, Shirley subjects in the malpractice condition assigned higher
probabilities to this item than George subjects in the malpractice condition

(73.5~

versus 53.8%, respectively).

As with the first prediction

item, Shirley's unfavorable ending generated more agreement with Dr. M.
than George's unfavorable ending.
Having found overall mean differences, analytical comparisons were
conducted that confirmed the first study hypothesis with this prediction
measure.

Subjects who received unfavorable patient outcome information

considered it more unlikely that they would recommend the same treatment
plan as Dr. M.

than

outcome information,

subjects who either

£

(1,156)=34.30, or

patient outcome information,

£

received favorable patient
subjects who received no

(1,156)=31.18.

As with the prior likeli-

hood measure, analytical comparisons did not reveal a significant dif-
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ference between control

subjects and those who

patient outcome information on this measure.

received favorable

As compared to favorable

or no patient outcome information, unfavorable patient outcome information diminished the perceived probability of making the same treatment
recommendation as Dr. M.

It is also interesting to note that, when com-

pared to no patient outcome information,

favorable patient outcome

information did not significantly increase the perceived probabilities
associated \..·ith this item.

The case factor exerted no influence on the

overall significance or pattern of results found with these

analytical

comparisons.
The hypothesis that malpractice information would exaggerate the
hindsight effect was again not confirmed with this measure.

There was a

significant mean difference between subjects in the unfavorable and
malpractice condition,

£

(1,156)=11.23; however,

the opposite direction than hypothesized.

the difference was in

As shown in Table 2, subjects

in the malpractice condition considered it more likely that they would
recommend the same treatment plan as Dr. M. than did subjects in the
unfavorable condition (63.6% versus 48.2%, respectively).

Despite this

contrast with the unfavorable condition, subjects in the malpractice
condition did report significantly less predictive agreement with Dr.
M.'s treatment plan than did
tion,

£

(1,156)=6.28,

subjects in either the favorable condi-

or in the control condition,

£

(1,156)=4.94.

There were no case effects associated with these latter findings.
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The Outcome Scenario
The third likelihood estimate pertained to the perceived probability of a favorable patient outcome given Dr. M. 's clinical assessment
and treatment plan.

As summarized in Table 2, significant mean differ-

ences were found as a function of outcome condition,

£ (3,156)=23.60.

As with the clinical assessment prediction, there was little difference
in mean response on this measure between subjects in the favorable or
control conditions or between subjects in the unfavorable and malpractice condition.

However,

there was an appreciable mean difference

between the subjects in the favorable or control conditions and subjects
in the unfavorable or malpractice conditions.

As seen in Table 2,

receiving unfavorable patient outcome information decreased the perceived probability of a favorable patient outcome as compared to receiving favorable or no patient outcome information.
Along with an overall mean differences as a function of outcome
information, the variances associated with the group mean responses were
significantly different,Cochrans

f =.43.

As seen in Table 2, the two

groups of subjects who received unfavorable patient outcome information
were more variable in their estimates than subjects who received favorable or no patient outcome information.

This pattern was significant

both with the transformed and untransformed values suggesting that the
finding is more than artifactual.
formed and untransformed measures.)

(See Method for discussion of transAlthough statistically nonsignifi-

cant, the same trend of increased variability for unfavorable and malpractice subjects was apparent with the other two prediction measures.
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The issue of differential variability is less

~

statistical con-

cern than a point of substantive interest within the context of the
hindsight phenomenon.

It has been demonstrated that the analysis of

variance is quite robust with respect to the assumption of homogeneity
of variance (Harris, 1985; Hays, 1981; Tabachnick & Fidel,
1971).

Further,

analysis

1983; Winer,

the standard tests for variance differences

of variance

are notoriously sensitive tests

Tabachnick & Fidel, 1983;

Winer,

variability

the Cochran's test

detected by

1971).

Therefore,
does

(Hays,

in the
1981;

the differential
not necessarily

undermine the validity of the test for mean differences using the analysis of variance.

But the differential variances among outcome condi-

tions may represent a meaningful concomittant of hindsightful evaluations.
In terms of specific tests

of the study hypotheses, analytical

comparisons again confirmed the presence of hindsight bias. Specifically, subjects in the unfavorable condition gave significantly lower
probability estimates of a favorable patient outcome than did

subjects

in either the favorable condition, F (1,156)=49.24, or the control condition,

£

(1,156)=33.84.

Control subjects did not give significantly

different estimates than subjects in the favorable condition.
Support of the hypothesis that malpractice information would exaggerate the hindsight effect was not found.

However,

analytical compar-

isons did expose the nature of a significant interaction effect found in
the univariate analysis between outcome condition and subject gender, F
(3,144)=2.74.

Male subjects in the malpractice condition assigned lower

probabilities to the

chances of a favorable patient outcome than did
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men in the unfavorable condition

(47.75~

versus

However, signficant differences were not found

54.50~,

respectively).

between the group means.

In contrast, female subjects in the favorable and malpractice conditions
were found to give significantly different estimates,

I (1,156)=7.77.

But, as discovered with the second likelihood estimate, the difference
was in the opposite direction than hypothesized for all subjects.

Spe-

cifically, the average value for women in the unfavorable condition was
45. 50~o as compared to a value of 62. 25~o for women in the malpractice
condition.

The gender by condition interaction did not affect the over-

all significance or the overall pattern of results for the earlier tests
of the first study hypothesis.
Open-ended Versus Forced-Sum Measures
To allow comparisons with prior research on hindsight bias, all of
the preceding analyses were conducted with forced-sum probability estimates.

A secondary goal of the present research was to repeat the same

sequence of analyses with an open-ended probability measure to determine
whether the hindsight bias effect would generalize across a different
type of dependent measure.
outcome-specific prediction,

Thus, for the third prediction, i.e. the
subjects were

asked to generate

open-ended and forced-sum probability estimates.

both

(See Method for a

detailed description of the open-ended estimates.) Before pursuing the
univariate analyses of variance with the open-ended estimate, the correlation between the forced-sum and open-ended estimate of the favorable
patient outcome was calculated and found to be moderate ( ! =.63).
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As with the forced-sum estimate, the univariate analysis of variance revealed significant mean differences as a function of outcome condition,

I (3,156)=13.61.

Based on the open-ended estimate, there was

little difference in mean predictions of a favorable patient outcome
between subjects in the unfavorable and malpractice conditions, (53.9%
and 54.0%, respectively). This was also true using the forced-sum estimate.

There was more difference in mean response with the open-ended

estimate between subjects in the favorable and control conditions (77.0%
and 65.9%, respectively) than found with the forced-sum estimate.

How-

ever, the major result found with the forced-sum estimate was replicated
with the open-ended measure.

Subjects in the unfavorable and malprac-

tice conditions assigned lower open-ended probabilities to the favorable
outcome than subjects in either the control or favorable conditions.
Two main effects were found with the open-ended estimate that were
not found with the forced-sum estimate.

There was a trend for women to

assign higher open-ended probabilities to the favorable patient outcome
than men, 65.88% versus 50.50%, respectively,

I (1,144)=4.73.

A closer

examination of cell means did not reveal a pattern for the gender differential to be more clearly associated with some outcome conditions
more than others. The second main effect involved the case factor.

Con-

sistent with prior results, a favorable Shirley outcome received higher
open-ended estimates than did a favorable George outcome(66.19% versus
59.

19~o,

respectively),

I ( 1, 144 )=5. 70.

A closer examination of cell

means revealed that the largest case differential was between subjects
in the unfavorable condition.

Specifically, Shirley subjects in the

unfavorable condition assigned higher open-ended probabilities to a fav-
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orable patient outcome than did George subjects in the unfavorable condition (60. O~o versus 47. 8~c,, respectively).

There were no signficant

differences in variances among the outcome conditions as found with the
forced-sum measure.
Analytical comparisons with the open-ended estimate confirmed the
first study hypothesis.

As with the forced-sum measure, subjects who

received unfavorable patient outcome

information gave significantly

lower open-ended probabilities than subjects who received either favorable patient outcome information,
information,

E

E

(1,156)= 29.64,or no patient outcome

In contrast to results with the forced-

(1,156)= 7.98.

sum measure, analytical comparisons revealed differences in open-ended
estimates between favorable and control subjects,

E

(1,156)=6.85.

Sub-

jects who received favorable patient outcome information tended to give
higher

predictions of a favorable patient outcome than subjects who

received

no

patient

64.88~,respectively).

outcome

information

(77.00~

versus

Finally, support of the hypothesis that malprac-

tice information would exaggerate the hindsight effect was not found
with the open-ended estimate.

Subjects in the unfavorable and malprac-

tice conditions did not differ in their open-ended estimates.
Hindsight Bias and Evaluative Judgment
The Evaluation Index
A final major hypothesis of the present study stated that hindsight bias would influence
judgment.

subjects' ratings of the quality of Dr. M. 's

Specifically, the expectation was that subjects in the unfa-

vorable condition would rate Dr. M. 's judgment less favorably than sub-
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jects

in either the

favorable or control conditions.

It was

also

hypothesized that the hindsight bias would be exaggerated with information about consequences facing the expert.
tion was

Specifically, the expecta-

that subjects in the malpractice condition would give more

unfavorable ratings

of Dr. M. 's judgment than would subjects

unfavorable condition.

As a measure of subjects'

in the

evaluations of Dr.

M. 's judgment, a global evaluation index was calculated for each subject.

This index was the average response to four different ratings.

In each case, higher values represented more favorable evaluations of
Dr. M. 's judgment.

Before conducting analytical comparisons as specific

tests of the study hypotheses,

an analysis of variance was conducted

that confirmed an overall significant effect of outcome condition on the
global evaluation index,

I

(3,156)=40.52. As seen in Table 3, subjects

in both the unfavorable and malpractice conditions gave lower evaluations of Dr. M. 's judgment than did subjects in either the control or
favorable conditons.
Along with a significant group effect, there was also a significant case effect,

£

(1,144)=4.41.

Subjects assigned to read Shirley's

case gave more favorable evaluations of Dr. M. 's judgment than George
subjects

(4.25 versus 3.98,

respectively).

Closer examination of the

cell means revealed that the case differential was most pronounced for
subjects in the unfavorable condition.
rable condition assigned more favorable

Shirley subjects in the unfavoratings to Dr. M. 's judgment

than did George subjects in the unfavorable condition (3.62 versus 2.91,
respectively).
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Table 3 also shows that the variability associated with the group
mean responses was significantly different as

Subjects receiving unfavorable outcome

information, Cochrans C =.38.
information,

a function of outcome

in either the unfavorable or malpractice conditions, were

significantly more

variable

in

their responses

received favorable outcome information.

than subjects

who

The largest difference in group

variability was found between subjects in the unfavorable and the favorable conditions.

Specifically, subjects

in the unfavorable condition

were more than twice as variable in their overall evaluation of Dr. M. 's
judgment as subjects in the favorable condition.

Table 3 also shows

that there was minimal difference in group variability on the evaluation
index for subjects in the unfavorable and malpractice conditions. Thus,
receiving unfavorable outcome information extended the range of subject
ratings and significantly

diminished the value of the ratings for eval-

uative judgment as it did for certain measures of predictive judgment.
After confirming the overall effect of outcome information on subjects'

evaluations of Dr. M. 's judgment, analytical comparisons were

conducted to test the specific study hypotheses.

The first

hypothesis,

information would

specifically that unfavorable

outcome

study

diminish subjects' ratings of the quality of Dr. M. 's judgment, was confirmed.

Negative outcome information biased subjects'

the predicted direction.
diton

Specifically, subjects in the unfavorable con-

gave signficantly lower expert evaluations than subjects who

received favorable patient outcome
than

evaluations in

subjects

(1,156)=54.ll.

who

received

no

information,

patient

outcome

£ ( 1, 156)=92. 52,
information,

and

F

Significant differences were also found between subjects
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who received favorable patient outcome information and control subjects,
F (1,156)=5.12.

On the average, subjects who received favorable outcome

information were more impressed with Dr. M. 's judgment than subjects who
had no access to outcome information.
The

hypothesis stating that mention of a malpractice suit would

exaggerate the bias

was not confirmed by the analytical comparisons.

As seen in Table 3, subjects in the malpractice and unfavorable conditions did not differ in their evaluations of Dr M.

Table 3
Global Evaluation Index by Outcome Condition

Outcome Condition
Dependent Measure

Control

Favorable

Unfavorable

Malpractice

4.58

5.05

3.26

3.57

.73

.40

1.03

1.01

N

F

df

.r_

Global Evaluation
Index
Mean
SD*

*statistically significant; Cochrans C

= .38

160

40.52

(3,156)

<.OS
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Selected
Along with the

ind~x

Eval~ative

Judgments

items, other evaluative questions were

included on the questionnaire to explore possible relationships with
certain types of outcome information.

These questions assessed: (a) the

proportion of blame assigned to Dr. M. for the unfavorable patient outcome; (b) agreement with four descriptive statements about the nature of
the case and alternative treatment plans; and (c) rank orderings of Dr.
M.'s treatment recommendation relative to four alternative treatment
solutions.

Subject responses to these dependent measures were compared

as a function of the four outcome conditions.
The analysis of variance was used to test mean differences in the
proportion of blame assigned to Dr. M. as a function of the four outcome
conditions.

Significant mean differences were found,

E

(2,177)=3.79.

However, the overall mean differences were not interpretable because of
a significant group by case interaction,

E (2,108)=3.66.

Table 4 shows

that among Shirley subjects, those in the unfavorable condition assigned
the least amount of blame to Dr. M.
means were not significantly different.

For George subjects, the group
These

results might be related

to the recurring finding that Shirley subjects in the unfavorable condition

expressed more predictive agreement and more evaluative support of

Dr. M. 's judgment than did George subjects in the unfavorable condition.

Table 4
Supplemental Evaluations as a Function of Outcome Condition

Evaluation Item

Control

Favorable

Unfavorable

Shirley Subjects

51.5%

NA*

22.6%

45.0%

60

8.18

(2,57)

<.05

George Subjects

66.6%

NA*

62.9%

59.0%

60

.48

(2,57)

NS

3.42

3.42

4.82

4. 77

158

12.80

(3,155)

<.05

Malpractice

N

F

df

Proportion of Blame
Assigned to Dr. M.

Agreement of Need for
More Conservative
Treatment**

*The question of blame was not relevant to subjects who received favorable outcome information.
**The agreement scale ranged from "l" (disagree strongly) to 11 6 11 (agree strongly).

VI
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Subjects were asked to use a six point Likert 'scale to indicate
their level of agreement with four statements that summarized possible
points of contention between foresightful and hindsightful observers.
These points addressed:

(a) the perceived difficulty of the clinical

case; (b) the perceived need for more patient information before making
a treatment recommendation;

(c) the perceived need for a professional

consultation before making a treatment recommendation; and (d) the perceived need for a more conservative treatment plan than the one Dr. M.
recommended.

In Shirley's case, the more conservative treatment plan

recommended that Shirley

see a physician immediately.

In George's

case, the more conservative treatment plan involved keeping George in
the hospital.
Outcome condition did not have a significant influence on the perceived need for more patient information or on the perceived need for a
professional consultation.

Nor did outcome information influence sub-

jects' assessments of the overall difficulty of the case.

However, as

presented in Table 4, subjects' level of agreement regarding the need
for the more conservative treatment approach was found to be a function
of

outcome condition,

£

(3,155)=12.80.

Subjects in the unfavorable or

malpractice conditions were more likely to agree with the need for a
more conservative treatment approach.
(1,137)=78.90.

A case effect was also found, [

Overall, Shirley subjects were more likely to agree with

this need than were George subjects(4.96 versus 3.39, respectively).
In addition, subjects were asked to rank order five treatment
plans from "l"(most preferred) to "S"(least preferred).

Along with Dr.

M. 's specific recommendation for Shirley or George, other treatment
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solutions listed included:

(a) arranging for more patient informa-

tion; Cb) discussing the case with other professionals;(c) recommending a
somewhat more cautious approach than Dr. M.; and (d) recommending a much
more cautious approach than Dr. M.

In Shirley's case, the somewhat more

cautious treatment plan involved advising her to see a physician if her
physical problems continued; the much more cautious plan advised her to
see a physician immediately.

In George's case, the somewhat more cau-

tious plan advised him to enter a halfway house; the much more cautious
plan referred George immediately to the psychiatric unit of the hospital.
Kendall's coefficient of concordance was calculated to determine
whether subjects within conditions tended to rank order
ment plans similarly.

the five treat-

Given previous differences associated with case,

Kendall's test for concordance was conducted separately for Shirley and
for George subjects.

As summarized in Table 5, agreement was found

within each outcome condition for subjects assigned to read George's
case history.

However, only Shirley subjects in the unfavorable and

control conditions were found to give homogeneous ratings to the five
items.

Table 5
Within Group Agreement on Item Rank Orderings by Case

Group

W*

Shirley
x2
df

N

p_

W*

x2

George
df

N

p_

Control

.26

20.52

4

20

< • 05

.21

15.86

4

19

<

.05

Favorable

.03

2.99

4

19

NS

.46

32.04

4

18

<

.05

Unfavorable

.21

16.04

4

19

< • 05

.19

15.10

4

20

< • 05

Malpractice

.11

7.79

4

18

NS

.31

23.69

4

19

< • 05

*Kendall's coefficient of concordance ranges from "O" (no agreement) to "l" (total agreement).
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To examine whether the specific rank order

assigned to each of

the five items was influenced by the outcome information subjects had
received, an analysis of group effects was conducted.
the results based on Kruskall Wallis' test.

Table 6 presents

Although Kruskall Wallis'

test uses the sum of the rank orderings to test group differences, Table
6 presents the mean rank ordering associated with each outcome condition
to maintain consistency with the
item.

of

the questionnaire

Because the original rank orderings ranged from

red) to
erence.
ment

response units

11

11

1 11 (most prefer-

5 11 (least preferred), higher means represent less subject prefAs seen in Table 6, the rank ordering of two of the five treat-

plans was

significantly different

as a

function of outcome

condition, specifically, Dr. M.'s treatment recommendation, !

2

=153)=28.94, and the most conservative treatment alternative, !
=154)=22.45.

(2, N
2

(2, ~

Subjects in the unfavorable and malpractice conditions

expressed less preference for Dr. M. 's treatment plan and more preference for the most conservative treatment plan than did subjects in
either the favorable or control conditions.

The case factor did not

influence either the overall significance of these latter findings or
the overall pattern of results.

Table 6
Rank Ordering of Two Treatment Plans as a Function of Outcome Condition*

Malpractice

x2

Control

Favorable

Unfavorable

df

Dr. M.'s Treatment Plan

2.69

2.68

3.98

3. 71

28.94

2

153

<

Most Conservative
Treatment Plan

4.03

3.95

2.72

3.08

22.45

2

154

< • 05

N

*Subjects rank ordered five treatment plans from "l" (most preferred) to "5" (least preferred).

.05
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Additional analyses were conducted with the goal of uncovering
other potentially useful information about biased evaluations of an
expert's judgment.

After testing the original study hypotheses, it was

thought that some of the supplemental evaluation items that were not
significantly different across the four outcome conditions might differ
as a function of another reclassification of subjects.
seemed possible that

Specifically, it

subjects who evidenced the most hindsight bias

relative to their peers might have assigned more blame to Dr. M.,
expressed more preference
for arranging for a
perceive the case as

for gathering more patient information and

professional consultation , and be less likely to
difficult than other subjects who received unfavo-

rable patient outcome information and than other subjects who received
either favorable or no patient outcome information.
Operationally, this new

subgroup of subjects, called the "hind-

sight group" was identified by their responses to the major dependent
measures of the study, namely the three forced-sum prediction estimates
and the overall evaluation index.
"hindsight group."

Twenty-two subjects qualified as the

These subjects, who had

all received unfavorable

patient outcome information from either the unfavorable or malpractice
condition, gave an average estimate of the three favorable patientrelated outcomes that was more than one-half of a standard deviation
(more than 10 percentage points) below the mean for all other subjects
receiving the same unfavorable patient outcome.
gave an overall rating of Dr. M. that was

Further, these subjects

more than one-half of a stan-

dard deviation (more than . 45 units) below all other subjects who
received the same unfavorable patient outcome information.

Once identi-
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fied by these criteria, these 22 subjects represented 13 men and 9
women.

However, they disporportionately represented subjects assigned

to George's case,

~2

(2,

~

=22)=6.27.

Specifically, 73% of the hind-

sight group had been assigned to George's case.

This result was not

surprising given the recurring finding that George subjects in the unfavorable and malpractice conditions assigned lower probabilities to the
major dependent prediction measures than did Shirley subjects in the
unfavorable and malpractice conditions.

The hindsight group (Group I in

Tables 7 and 8) was compared with all other subjects who did not meet
the above criteria, but who had also been assigned to the unfavorable or
malpractice conditions (Group II in Tables 7 and 8), and with the
remaining study subjects for whom hindsight bias was not applicable,
namely those in the favorable or control conditions (Group III in Tables
7 and 8).
Univariate analyses of variance with each of the auxilliary evaluation items did not reveal significant mean differences in subjects'
perceptions of the need for a professional consultation,for more patient
information, or in perceptions of the overall case difficulty as a function of the new three-group reclassification.
that two results from

However, Table 7 shows

the analyses of variance were significant as a

function of the new classification.

Table 7
A Comparison of Supplemental Evaluations as a Function of Post Hoc Reclassification*

Evaluation Item
Percent Blame Assigned
to Dr. M. for Unfavorable
Patient Outcome**
Agreement with Need for
More Conservative
Treatment

Group I

Group II

Group III

N

F

df

66.6%

40.1%

59.0%

120

11.26

(2,117)

< • 05

5.18

4.65

3.42

159

20.79

(2,156)

< • 05

*The post hoc reclassification distinguished among students who received unfavorable outcome
,information and demonstrated the most hindsight bias on the principle dependent measures relative
to their peers (Group I,~= 21-22), students who also received unfavorable outcome information but
who did not fulfill the bias criteria for Group I (Group II, N = 55-58), and all other subjects who
received either favorable or no patient outcome information (Group III,~= 76-80).
**The question of blame was not relevant to subjects who received favorable outcome information.
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First, an overall group difference was found regarding the amount
of blame assigned to Dr. M.,

!

(2,117)=11.26.

Interestingly, the larg-

est mean difference occurred between the hindsight group and Group II
subjects who also received unfavorable patient outcome information
(66. 66~0 versus 40. 09~o,

respectively), and not between the hindsight

group and Group III subjects who received either favorable or no patient
outcome information

(66.6~

versus

59.1~,respectively).

Second, Table 7

shows that the reclassified subgroups also differed in their level of
agreement with the need for a more conservative treatment approach,

!

(2, 156 )=20. 79. As seen in Table 7, there was a 1. 76 unit difference
between the hindsight group and the group of subjects who received opposite or no patient outcome. Of the three groups, the hindsight group
agreed the most

with the need for a most conservative approach.

Although the pattern of results was different for the item on blame, the
same two dependent measures were significantly different across the
three-group classification as they were across the original four study
conditions.

Thus, the new classification supported rather than added to

the information already discovered in the original analyses.
The rank ordering of treatment plans was also examined as a function of the three-group classification.

Kendall coefficient of concor-

dance was calculated to determine whether subjects within these three
groups tended to rank order the five treatment plans similiarly.
nificant agreement was found within each of the three groups.

Sig-

The rank

orderings of the five treatment plans were examined to determine if they
varied as a function of the three group reclassification.

As discovered

with the four group comparison , the Kruskall Wallis test for the three
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group comparison uncovered mean differences with the ranking of Dr. M. 's
treatment plan, x 2 (4, ~ =153)=37 .12, and of the most conservative
treatment plan, x 2 (4, ~ =154)=22.25.

(See Table 8.)

However, in con-

trast to the four group comparison, a third mean rank was also found to
differ among the three redefined subgroups.

As seen in Table 8, there

was an overall difference found with the ranking of the need for more
patient information, x 2 (4, N =153)=8.40.
hindsight group,

The Group I subjects, the

expressed more preference for gathering additional

patient information than did both Group II subects who also received
unfavorable patient outcome information and Group III subjects who
received favorable or no patient outcome information.

Thus, subjects

who evidenced the most hindsight bias were more likely than all other
subjects to perceive a need for more patient information before making a
definitive recommendation.

Table 8
A Comparison of Rank Ordered Treatment Plans as a Function of Post Hoc Reclassification*

Group I

Group II

Group III

x2

df

N

.P.

Dr. M.'s Treatment Plan

4.54

3.56

2.68

37.16

4

153

<

Most Conservative
Treatment Plan

2.68

2.98

3.99

22.25

4

154

< • 05

Plan to Arrange for More
Patient Information

1.95

3.07

2.78

8.40

4

153

<

.05

.05

*Subjects rank ordered five treatment plans from "l" (most preferred) to "5" (lesat preferred).
The post hoc reclassification distinguished among students who received unfavorable outcome
information and demonstrated the most hindsight bias on the principle dependent measures relative
to their peers (Group I, N = 21-22), students who also received unfavorable outcome information
but who did not fulfill the bias criteria for Group I (Group II, N = 55), andallother subjects
who received either favorable or no patient outcome information (Group III,~= 76-77).

CHAPTER IV

DISCUSSION

Overview
The present study was designed to assess three new questions
regarding the generality of hindsight bias:

(1) do the predictive dis-

tortions associated with outcome information generalize to a context
that includes a dissenting expert judgment? (2) does unfavorable outcome
information bias evaluative judgment as it has been found to bias predictive judgment? (3) does mention of a malpractice suit exaggerate any
predictive and evaluative distortions associated with outcome information?

After discussing the results pertaining to each of these ques-

tions, the larger theoretical and applied implications of the present
study will be explored.
Biased Predictive Judgment
Results of the present study provide

consistent evidence that

unfavorable outcome information biases subjective perceptions of predictive judgment. Across three prediction tasks, subjects who received
unfavorable patient outcome information reported significantly less
agreement with the expert than subjects who received either favorable or
no patient outcome information. That is, when the outcome contradicted
the expert judgment, subjects considered it comparatively unlikely that
they would:

(a) have made the same clinical assessment;(b) have recom-

mended the same treatment; or (c)

have anticipated a favorable patient

response given the expert assessment and treatment solution.
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These findings extend the domain of hindsight bias.
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The pre-

dictive distortions previously found as a function of outcome information were found to generalize to a context that includes a dissenting
expert judgment.

Prior research has consistently shown that outcome

information biases people's impressions of their predictive capabilities
(Fischhoff, 1975a,1975b,1977; Fischhoff & Beyth, 1975).

In hindsight,

people consistently overestimate what they would have foreseen without
the.benefit of hindsight.

Although the implication that hindsight bias

holds for the fairness of evaluating other decision-makers has been
acknowledged (Fischhoff, 1975a, 1982a; Hogarth, 1980), this study provided the first direct test of the relationship between outcome information that contradicts a prior decision and subjects'

assessments of

their predictive judgment relative to the original decision-maker.
Moreover, results showed that reporting an expert judgment that was
inconsistent with the outcome did not undermine the power of outcome
information to alter subjects' assessments of their predictive prowess.
Subjects did not defer to the expert judgment.

Rather, they reported a

superior capacity to anticipate the likelihood of unfavorable

events as

compared to subjects who received either favorable or no outcome information.

The influence of hindsight bias on subjects' assessments of

their predictive capabilities was found across both forced-sum and
open-ended probability measures, indicating that the hindsight effect in
this context is not restricted to one type of response format.
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Although the major hypotheses addressed the power of unfavorable
outcome information to decrease predictive agreement, it was interesting
to note that receiving confirmatory outcome information did not significantly increase predictive agreement as compared to receiving no outcome
information. The data from the present study revealed no significant
mean differences on any of the three prediction measures between subjects who received favorable outcome information and control subjects
who received no outcome information.

Both subject groups tended to

agree with the expert predictions. Thus,

in the absence of outcome

information, subjects seemed to defer to the expert judgment.
Biased Evaluative Judgment
The domain of hindsight bias was further extended by examining the
relationship between receiving outcome information that contradicted an
expert judgment and subsequent evaluations of that expert.

As hypoth-

esized, the receipt of outcome information systematically biased subjects' average ratings of the expert as it did their assessments of
their predictive capabilities.

Subjects who received unfavorable out-

come information not only presumed superior predictive capabilities as
compared to the expert, but they evaluated Dr. M. 's clinical judgment
more harshly than subjects who received either favorable or no patient
outcome information.
These results

extend evidence of hindsight bias from predictive

to evaluative judgment.

Subjects who received unfavorable outcome

information tended to believe not only that they would have made different decisions than the expert, but that the expert should have made dif-
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ferent decisions.

As hypothezized, the expert was held accountable for

not seeing possibilities that were only apparent to subjects in hindsight.
Secondary analyses were

conducted to examine whether receiving

favorable outcome information produced more favorable expert evaluations
than not receiving outcome information.

Unlike the comparisons of pre-

dictive agreement, significant mean differences were found in expert
ratings between subjects in the favorable and control conditions.

Spe-

cifically, subjects who received favorable outcome information were more
impressed with Dr. M. 's judgment than subjects who did not receive any
information about the patient's subsequent response to treatment.

Thus,

outcome information that seems to confirm an expert judgment does appear
to increase the perceived favorableness of that judgment; and outcome
information that contradicts an expert judgment appears to decrease the
perceived favorableness of that judgment.
The Influence of Context
In addition to demonstrating that the hindsight bias phenomenon
could be generalized to a context that included another person's judgment, it was of interest to test whether the predictive and evaluative
distortions could be manipulated by another contextual factor.

Specifi-

cally, it was hypothesized that mention of a pending malpractice suit
would exaggerate the predictive and evaluative distortions associated
with outcome information. This hypothesis was not supported by the data.
Opposite differences than were hypothesized were found on two of the
three prediction measures.

Specifically, subjects who read of a malp-
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ractice suit reported signficantly more predictive agreement with the
expert than subjects who read only of an unfavorable patient outcome.
That is, overall, they considered it more likely that they would recommend the same treatment plan as Dr. M. and more likely that a favorable
patient outcome would eventuate than did subjects who received unfavorable outcome information without any mention of a malpractice suit.

In

addition, the data analyses revealed an unanticipated gender by condition interaction for the outcome-specific prediction.

Among the men,

subject predictions did not vary as a function of the malpractice information.

However, among the women, subjects in the malpractice condition

reported more predictive agreement with the expert than did subjects in
the unfavorable condition. Yet, no differences were found in the average
rating of the quality of the expert judgment between subjects who
received unfavorable patient outcome information and those who also
received mention of a malpractice suit.
The fact that the subjects in the malpractice condition expressed
more predictive agreement with the expert than other subjects who
received unfavorable outcome information might reflect attitudes towards
malpractice.

Although mention of malpractice was intended to heighten

the sense of gravity associated with the expert "error," it may have
instead prompted certain feelings of compassion for the expert. A recent
Newsweek article (Press, 1986) suggested that an awareness of the growing number of invalid malpractice claims has generated a new wave of
support for physicians charged with malpractice.

Students in the pres-

ent study were perhaps more likely to side with the expert because of a
similiar attitude towards the inappropriate use of malpractice litiga-
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tion.

There is no apparent

explanation for the influence of gender on

this pattern of result.
In addition to this unanticipated context effect, the data provided some intriguing hints that the relative impact of unfavorable outcome information on predictive and evaluative judgment may depend on
other characteristics of the situation. In addition to thes malpractice
effect discussed above,
effect.

several analyses indicated an overall case

The case effect reflected the fact that Shirley subjects

reported more predictive and evaluative agreement with the expert
George subjects.

than

A closer examination of cell means revealed that the

case differential was most pronounced
vorable patient outcome information.

among subjects who received unfaSpecifically, the unfavorable

Shirley outcome generated more agreement with the expert than the unfavorable George outcome.
There are several factors that might account for the differential
impact of these two cases.

The case materials were different on a vari-

ety of dimensions including patient gender, age, family situation, and
symptomotology.

Although case effects were not found in the related

study of outcome information and social explanation (Ross, Lepper,
Strack, & Steinmetz, 1977), it is important to reiterate that Shirley's
case was modified for use in the present study.

Specifically, all men-

tion of her violent thoughts toward her son were excluded after it was
found to minimize the perceived credibility of her recovery among pilot
subjects.
Although the case histories were very different, it seems more
likely that the case effect was

related to the case endings. The unfa-
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vorable patient outcomes designed for Shirley and for George were
intended to reflect different kinds of judgmental error.

The case end-

ing designed for Shirley was intended to illustrate a protocol error.
Although Dr. M.

recognized Shirley's emotional needs and recommended

weekly psychotherapy, Dr. M. failed to refer Shirley to a physician as a
routine precautionary check on possible physical pathology.

In con-

trast, the unfavorable case ending written for George was intended to
reflect a judgmental miscalculation of the extent of patient psychopathology; Dr. M. failed to prescribe the right amount of psychological
help.

The subjects who read of George's unfavorable response reported

comparatively little predictive agreement or evaluative support of the
expert.

However, based on the comparatively supportive responses that

Dr. M. received from Shirley subjects, it seems possible that subjects
perceived Shirley's cerebral tumor to have represented a distinct problem outside of Dr. M. 's domain of responsibility. This interpretation is
supported by the results of the analyses on subjects' forced-sum assignments of blame to Dr. M. and the patient.

Shirley subjects in the unfa-

vorable condition assigned significantly less blame to Dr. M. as compared to Shirley subjects in the other conditions.
There is no direct way to ascertain whether subjects discriminate
between these two kinds of errors, whether the two kinds of errors were
appropriately depicted,or whether the distinction is a meaningful one in
terms of the hindsight effect on judgment.

These issues furnish possi-

ble topics for future research. However, there was evidence in the present study to suggest that the unfavorable Shirley outcome was less
salient than the unfavorable George outcome.

As discussed earlier, 10
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of the 12 subjects who failed the manipulation check were assigned to
read the unfavorable ending for Shirley.

Eight of these 10 subjects

mistakenly reported that there was no outcome information included in
the case history.

It may be that these subjects, introductory psychol-

ogy students fulfilling a course requirement, were particularly

attuned

to psychological issues and looking for psychological outcomes. Thus,
they were more likely to miss the information
bral tumor.

rega~ding

Shirley's cere-

This interpretation is consistent with prior research show-

ing that people's schemas for thinking about a situation guide their
attention to information and interpretation of that information (Fiske &
Taylor, 1984).

The many clues identified by these data clearly indicate

that more research is needed to explore possible contextual effects that
might mediate the predictive and evaluative distortions associated with
unfavorable outcome information.
Variability Differences As A Function Of Outcome Information
The results of this present investigation revealed not only the
mean differences described above, but they also uncovered significant
variance differences as a function of outcome condition.

Specifically,

subjects who received unfavorable outcome information were more variable
in their responses than subjects who received either favorable or no
outcome information for the outcome-specific prediction and for the
global evaluation measure.

The same trend, although not reaching sta-

tistical significance, was apparent in the other two prediction measures.

Although an unexpected pattern, this increased variability may

represent another meaningful concommitant of the hindsight effect.

It
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may be that information of an expert judgment and of a contradictory
outcome is not combined or interpreted in a uniform way for all people.
If the effect is not an experimental artifact associated only with this
study, it would be important to include measures of other potentially
relevant cognitive factors

to better interpret the increased variabil-

ity. Research in person memory (Hastie & Kumar, 1979) and on social
salience (Taylor & Fiske, 1978) has considered attention as crucial to
the ways that people deal with inconsistent information. For example,
Taylor and Fiske found that when someone in a group was made salient,
subjects tended to see that person as causing whatever was happening.
Further research should investigate

whether the variability differences

associated with outcome information replicate across other experimental
contexts and, if so, whether these differences are mediated by various
cognitive factors such as differential attention to inconsistent information.
Methodological Considerations
Before reviewing the theoretical significance of these findings in
greater detail, several methodological considerations that influence the
interpretation of these findings require mention.

Several of these con-

siderations pertain to the interpretation of the overall effect of outcome information on subject responses, while others
of external validity.
future research.

pertain to issues

In all, they identify several directions for

First, although judgmental differences were found in

the predicted direction as a function of outcome groups, it is possible
that the overall influence of outcome information was mediated by a
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recency effect.

In all but the control condition, the last information

that subjects received pertained to the patient response to treatment.
There has been some evidence for recency effects in similiar experimental tasks.

For example, Arkkelin et al.

(1979) found that the last

information given to subjects was the most readily utilized information
in a judgment task.
found to

Although recency effects have not consistently been

influence judgmental

responses

(Frieze,

1976), it would

strengthen the generalizability of these results to counter-balance the
textual position of the outcome information.
The overall influence of outcome information on subjects' predictive and evaluative responses may also have been effected by the
"concreteness" of the outcome information.

Cognitive research has con-

sistently demonstrated that concrete information, i.e., vivid information or information that described specific events, is more likely to be
attended to and recalled than abstract information, i.e., summary or
interpretive information (Hogarth, 1980).

For example,

Reyes, Thomp-

son, and Bower (1980) reported that, in a mock jury decision task, subjects recalled more "vivid" than "pallid" evidence and that

subjects'

judgments of apparent guilt paralleled their differential recall.

The

outcome information for all conditions in the present study was certainly more concrete than much of the

preceding case material.

Although information concreteness is a potentially important factor, it
again does not account for the between group differences.
Other methodological considerations pertain to external validity
issues.

It is perhaps difficult to identify circumstances in contempo-

rary life that exactly parallel the experimental conditions in the pres-
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ent study.

In a review of recent decision-making studies, Ebbeson and

Konecni (1980) expressed general concern about the external validity of
decision-making research that relies on laborary simulation of real
world phenomena.

In this instance, it is hard to imagine college stu-

dents being asked to use a 3000 word case history to evaluate the clinical judgment of a psychologist.
diately apparent.

Two external validity issues are imme-

First, there is the intuitively obvious difference in

level of expertise. The use of process research, specifically, thinkingaloud protocols,has

revealed that expert and novice clinicians employ

different interpretations of patient data cues as well as qualitatively
distinct "lines of reasoning" in reaching clinical judgments (Johnson,
Hassebrock, Duran, & Moller, 1982).

Carroll (1978,1980) also reported

results of expert-novice differences in the conceptualization of parole
decisions.

Nevertheless,

although clinical psychologists are more

appropriately trained than college students to render clinical judgments, there is evidence to show that they are not different than other
experts or than college students in their susceptibility to hindsight
bias (Arkes et al., 1981; Detmer et al., 1978) or to

other cognitive

biases in judgment (Casscells et al., 1978; Chapman & Chapman, 1982;
Eddy, 1982; Oskamp, 1982).

Thus, it is doubtful that the hindsight

effects would be limited to the· context of the present study for reasons
pertaining to expert-novice differences.
One could even argue that the present design provided a more conservative test of the effect of outcome information on evaluations of
others' decisions.

College students might be more likely than expert

clinicians to defer to an expert decision without an independent review
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of the evidence.

As discussed earlier, control subjects, who did not

receive any outcome information, did not differ from the subjects who
received favorable outcome information in their level of predictive
agreement with the expert.

Thus, in the absence of outcome information,

subjects tended to agree with the expert predictions.

In any case, it

would be important in future research to vary the expertise of the subject populations to determine the generalizability of the results
reported here.
The second limitation to external validity pertains to the anonymity of subject responses.
the

Subjects in the present study were assured of

complete anonymity of their responses.

Research has shown that

subjects' private perceptions and their public judgments are not necessarily similar (Ross & Anderson, 1982). It is impossible to determine
whether the responses from the present study represented subjects' public judgments, their private judgments, whether their private and public
judgments are identical, or whether subjects even have a real opinion on
the questions that they were asked.
many

Shelley Taylor (1976) noted that in

experiments, subjects are presented with a

asked to answer a series of questions.

lot of information and

In effect, the experimenter is

asking: Now that you have put everything together, what do you conclude?
Taylor noted that the more appropriate question might be:

How are you

putting this information together and do you have any conclusions?

In

the present study, it is possible that subjects did not feel equipped to
make patient-related predictions or to evaluate the expert.

However,

behaving as most study subjects (Carroll, 1980), they answered the questions anyway.

In terms of external validity, the concern here has less
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to do with whether subjects had the appropriate information or training
to make the judgments as compared to clinical psychologists.

There are

certainly countless experiences in contemporary life that one can point
to where individuals make decisions or volunteer opinions based on
insufficient information.

The concern here has more to do with whether

subjects' were reporting their considered opinions on the topics.
Although resolution of this issue is not required for discussion of the
between group differences,
research to

it does point to the need for process

explore how hindsightful predictions and evaluations are

made.
The Objectivity of Second-Guessing
Theoretical Significance
The present results provide important new evidence of hindsight
bias.

Most importantly, these results generalize evidence of hindsight

bias to the process of second-guessing the decisions of other people.
Specifically, these results demonstrate that the predictive distortions
associated with outcome information generalize to a context that
includes another person's judgment. Further, these results

demonstrated

that evaluative distortions result as a function of outcome information.
Secondary analyses revealed that outcome information did not have a consistent influence on all evaluative questions.

Of the nine auxilliary

evaluation items, only two were significantly different as a function of
outcome information.

Further, a reclassification of subjects based on

the relative amount of predictive and evaluative distortions apparent
in their responses did substantially change the overall pattern of
results.
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Taken together, these findings expand our knowledge of hindsight
bias.

They may also have relevance to the "fundamental attributional

error" (Ross, 1977), which refers to

people's tendency to underestimate

the situational constraints on others' behavior.

For instance,the dis-

counting of situational constraints was powerfully demonstrated in an
experiment conducted by Ross, Amabile, and Steinmetz (1977).

In a simu-

lated quiz game, both the contestants and observers of the experiment
believed that the questioners really were more knowledgeable than the
contestants even though everyone was fully aware that the questioner and
contestant roles were randomly assigned.

Jones and Nisbett (1971) sug-

gested that the tendency to underestimate situational factors when
explaining others' behavior results from the fact that observers and
actors have different perspectives.
the center of attention;

When observing, the person occupies

when acting, the environment commands our

attention.
Perhaps the results of the present study

reflect a specific

instance of a more general tendency to underestimate situational factors
when making inferences about other people.

In this instance, hindsight

subjects seem to discount the situational uncertainty that the original
decision-maker faced.

More research is needed to determine whether or

not the tendency to underestimate situational uncertainty is a principal
factor in the predictive and evaluative distortions found in hindsightful evaluations of others' judgment.

Discovering the specific cognitive

factors that cause the bias is critical to understanding many of the
practical implications of hindsight bias.
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Applied Implications
It is likely that we have all questioned a decision made by someone else, particularly when things turned out badly as a result of that
decision. The recent Challenger tragedy has opened up the entire NASA
organization to the hindsightful evaluations of a nation.

Although the

conventional focus in second-guessing is on the fallibility of their
judgment, results of the present study suggest that our inferences
about their judgment are themselves suspect.

Once informed of an unfa-

vorable outcome, we tend to believe that we would have made a different
decision and that the original decision-maker should have made a different decision.

These inferences do not result from our independent and

careful review of the same evidence that the original decision-maker
reviewed; rather, they result from "that special wisdom born of hindsight." (Fischhoff, 1975b)
Because of its grave practical importance, much research has been
directed at exploring various strategies to remove predictable cognitive
biases in judgment.

Some of the research has investigated ways of

training people to overcome cognitive biases (e.g.,Carroll & Siegler,
1977; Fischhoff, 1982b; Fischhoff, Slavic, & Lichtenstein, 1979; Gaeth &
Shanteau, 1984; Hogarth, 1980; Lichtenstein & Fischhoff, 1980; Nisbett &
Ross,

1980; Pitz & Sachs,

press).

1984; Zechmeister, Rusch, & Markell,

in

Other research has been directed at changing the structure of

decision tasks as a way of eliminating or reducing cognitive bias
(e.g. ,Hogarth, 1980; Miner, 1984; Rose, Menasco, & Curry, 1982).

Prior

research on hindsight bias has already provided some meaningful clues
for reducing the bias introduced by outcome information.

Specifically,
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having subjects generate explanations for alternative outcomes has successfully eliminated the predictive distortions associated with hindsight (Ross et al., 1977). Although it has not been demonstrated in an
experimental context, Fischhoff (1975b) proposed that that the best way
to overcome the bias in hindsightful evaluations would be to invite only
people blind to the outcome to review an uncertain situation and the
viability of various decisions.

Results from the present study strongly

suggest that cognitive or task interventions are needed to assure the
objectivity of hindsightful evaluations.
Taken together, these results have critical implications for
numerous circumstances in contemporary life that rely on hindsightful
evaluations to assess people's judgment.

It is clear from these find-

ings that undetected hindsight bias undermines the objectivity of those
evaluations.

When an unfortunate event occurs, what is needed is not a

biased investigation of another's judgment; rather, what is needed and
fair to all concerned is an unbiased investigation of another's judgment.
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ShP. rP.coqnizea that her

her welfare

~he

ness:

Shirley•s

vouta

fa1ily life

h'pocbondriacal,
Shirle! ana
effectiwe
oeriod~

to take

aother was preoccupied

with ill-

vhenP.Yer

qreat.

These
an1

and.they

controlling

the pressures
illnesses,

the

largely

syapathy fro•

were her

of

both

aotber•s aost

faaily.

Daring

the

of her aother•s •illnesses• it beca•e Shirley's aaty
ower the responsibility

unabashealy

her

be ooenly

brought support

her father,
•eans of

it cUff icult to

beco1e "ill"

becaae too

found intoler-

paro.nts were. concerned with

although the! founa

affect ion ate.

often

vhich Shirley

~ry

critici~ea

Sbirley•s

of the boae.

Ber aotber

perforaance.

llthoagh

annoyed with her •other's illnesses, Shirley teot

irritation to

herself,

belieYing

alternative to this state of affairs.

that

t~ere

was

no
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Shirle1•s
essenti~ll!

early

physical

nor•al.

and

social

ae•elop•ent

vas

Vben the restricti•enss of ber parents

seriously li•ited her friendships, she •ade uo fantasy ,1ay•ates to

while avay the ti•e.

started in

a

gra~e

•uch rougher

oarents

of students

and

found

•uch of

reconcile vith the stanaards
Dorin~

her

school days,

their
of con-

Shirley's

their oolicy nf keeping her apart fro• the

"bad" children of her
lon~ly,

herself,

her ho•e.

c~ntinue~

was co•oosea

Shirley regarded the other stuaents

than

behavior difficult to
duct set in

siK Shirley

school which

fro• lower-class ho•es.
as

Jt the age of

~hough

neighborhood.

Shirley ne•er

felt that it was a

frustr!ted ana

•atter which she

could discuss vith her parents.
~~

approached

s~e

tended to

sex,

vitb

indirect warnings about the

s~hool

at

fourtee~

in an essentially Up?erinferior

poise and
tahle.

to thosP

~t

~his

ti•e,

and

foon~

ai~dle-class

of the

snobbish ways •ade

transferre~

at ease.

ho•e after dart.
dangers of

shP recei•ei little or no sex instruction.

entered high

ver~

•ery •iqorously.

she vas not per•itted

bo•s or to be away fro•

vere nu•erous
~ut

vith boys

as she enterP,d her teens,

as~ociate

~here

Shirlev•s father in particular

restrict her contact

Initially,
to

po~erty,

herself at a loss

school.

other children,
her feel

against

Shirley

Ber clot•es
and tbeir

extre•ely ancoafor-

her parents•

wishes,

she

to a Yocational school. where she felt aacb •ore

Hove•er, the expressed antisocial behaTior of •anT
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of the children shocked her.
police

recor~s,

an~

of the hors alreadr bad

the girls were not ashaaei of recounting

their serual adventures.
beqan to date.

Soae

It was

at this tiae that Sbirter

Rer father bitterly opoose3

this;

it was

only after a •iolent fight that peraission was qrante4 to be
a~

out until ten

night.

Don, who was her age.

During this

perioa,

Shirley aet

One evening, after a few 4ates,

induced b@r into having serual relations, asiag,
descrihe~

Don

as Shirley

i+, •considerable force" to get bis way.

However,

Sbirler describei the experience in rather bland teras, su9ges~ing

nor

that

she found

the experience

She also

unplPa~~~able.

did not reae•ber exoeriencinq

over this incid~nt,

any guilt

social disapproval

shout~

neither pleasurable

but

the other

she did have a
tia~ fin~

out.

fear of
Shirle'

and Don continued to have seraal relations for tbe following
tvo aonths,

during which she

Don's deaands.

suhaitted without pleasure

Then Don becaae

and their relationship gradually
feeling

relie•ed at

breat-uo vith Don,
avoided intercourse.
ting,

the end

•a~

but vas at a loss on

in a respectable fashion.

dissolved.

of this

She re•eabers

affair.

lfter

t•e

but sbe

ieterestea in kissing aa4 pet•
hov to coaMunicate this to boys

She

of pretendinq

to be asleep wben

these periods

she would

•a~ing

interested ia another 9irl

Shirle' continued to date boys,
Sbe

t~

finallT hit on the solution
alone with a

perait tbe

bOT to

boy.

During

aate ad•ances,

up vben the advances went beyond •bat she 4eslred.
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Confliet

and discord

during this period,
fathPr in

within the

father before
was daring

bad to endure
~e

would relent and finally let

-lthouq~

avare that she

Shirley

oppressi•e

aontbs

ShirlPv described

ll

s~xual

interest

in 'is

beca•e

ho~e

"nic~

description of ll

in lo•e

as it would

en•ironaent.

They were

ber

a~pro•al.

parent's

~f

gar" vho took care

gratifTin~,

frigid.

in•olYe~

which

was not coaoletely

later with

Al as a

relations

and

tt

asked Shirley to aarry

and vas kind of fatherly tov!rd her.
foun3

~o.

a aan

found his proposal desirable

get her out of her
three

fro• her

her

aet ll,

After a brief courtship

soae aborted sexual ezperiences,

•arried

a 4ate.

Shirley vas sirteen at the ti•e and found ll

quite attracti•e.

with Al,

to go oat oa

physical panish•eDt

this period that Shirley

late twenties.

intense

and ShirleT often had to fight with ber

order to obtain per•ission

'regaently she

hia.

bo•e re•ained

At tbe beginning, sbe
bat

In

qra~o!ll•

•any

vas Yery Taque,

her

and

she lost

ways,

Shirley's

farther ••estioning

produced little additional infor•ation.
lfter

ft

fev •ontbs o!

aarriaqe,

growing aore llstaat froa 11,
for other interests.

She

and

signe~

Shirley

found herself

she beqan to loot aroand
up for a

course in •osic

appreciation giYen by a local •aslcian of some repute.
foana herself •er, aueh attractea to the
vit.hin a short ti•e theT vere
she vas

te~eher,

3aaes, and

in•ol•ea in an affair.

eiqhteen ShirleT divorced

She

her hasbana and

lhen
went to
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li•e with

To

Ja•e~.

aeri•P.a fro•
cessful ly

supple•ent the •ea9er inco•e Ja•es

his •usic appreciation coarses.
a s•all

operate~

She found

~elp

record aad

Jaaes was a •ery

Shirley sac-

sheet •asic

bohe•ian type who

store.

cared little

for •aterial thinqs and qradaally left the financial support
of the
with

up

r~lationshiD

Ja•es was

a •ery

working infrequently.
with other

to Shirley.

wo•~n,

Shirley's relationship

te•pestuous one.

In aadition

Ja•es conductea a nu•ber

often flaantinq tbe•

i~

of aff!irs

front of Shirley.

Shirley reported that she was je3lous to a •ild deqree.
also. she felt •ore

of

desir~us

hi• because o•her vomen vere.
to leaye
"O~

JaaPs and be

~oo1~v."

When

Ja•~s

At ti•es. Shirle' thre!tene1

usually replied with
Shirley

~his hap~ened,

J~aes

Shirley

an unconcerned
beca•e terribly

felt an intense sexual

and not once aid she

but

and •ore interested in

upset an3 she wnuld beg Ja•es to take her bact.
the affair,

to

Thr~aqhoat

attraction for

eKperience the loss of desire or

the frigidity characteristic of the situation with ber first
bu$h~n~.

Jft•es

supnort her

ana his

constantly.eaphasized
lack of aesire

wbene•er Shirley raise4 the lssae

his inability

to confor•

to

to society

of •arrla9e.

It vas during tbe affair vitb Ja•es that Shirley's fatber
became seriously ill.

She recei•ea a telegra• fro• a rela-

tiY@ asking h@r to return to her ho•e tovn;
want to qo because she
vith Ja•es

was

at that ti•e.

ha•i~q

bat she 414 not

consiaerahte llfflealties

Her father died

shortly after-
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and Shirley felt intense quilt because she faitea to

ward~,

see her father before his
died,

Shirley's

death.

•other beca•e

Shortly after •er father
e•otionallf ill.

Sbe was

goinq through the •enopaase and deyeloped acate in•olational
Shirley vent back to her

sy•ptoas.
necessa~y

for

to baYe

treataent.

her •other eoa•itted to. a
lqain

feelinas about

order to return to
hosoit~l

Shirley

stat~

hospital

expP.rienced intense

taking this action,

left her •other in the

state

bo•e t.own and foani it

particularly

guilt

since she

hospital shortlf after co••itaent in
Shirley's •other reaained ln the

J~•es.

for one year at which t.iae she vas

discharge~

as i• proved.
Daring the latter ohase of her affair with Jaaes,
tried sP.Yeral tiaes

to leaye hi•,

S~irley

bot

eYentually realized

aaaze~

to see bow intensely

that it vas iapossible.

She was

she was boona to

At ti•es, she felt that he coald do

Ja~es.

anything to ber, regardless of how crael or hu•iliating, and
she voald endure it without coaplaint.
erpressed a

desire to haTe

~hirley beca~e

pregnant.

a ·child and

lt one point, Jaaes
shortly thereafter

Darinq this pregnancy, Shirley was

oft.en ill, sufferinCJ fre(faent bouts of nausea and •eac!aetaes.
James

vorted •ery

little

and

part-ti•P. in the afternoons.
in the aornings to
get
it

av~'

r~st,

from the house.

~ssible

to •ate so•e

Shirley continued

to

work

She often longed to stay llo•e

bat Ja•es insistec! that she

shoal~

Daring the pregnancT Shirley found
de•ands on Ja•es.

one •ornlnq,

106

Shirlev and

JaRes bad

a particularly

Yiolent arguaent

in

which Shirlev vas annoyed that Ja•es wouldn't help ber clean
the

house.

vas

ShP

particularly

should clean the attic.

deterained that

Ja•e~

Shortly after their arqaaent, when

Shirlev qot into the car to leave for work, Ja•es kissed her
goo~bv

said,

an~

•oon•t be

an~ry

vitb ae."

When Sbirlev

returned hoae she found Jaaes dead, hanqing fro• a rafter in
an

iaaacalately clean

attic.

ShirleT

bat

recoverP.d in a

fev

her behavior.

She called the police, and aade arranqeaents

for the funeral.

boa~s

ba~

live~

with Jaaes for

she aost baYe been secretly

relationship caae to an

Ja•es•s death:

necessary

to feiqn

not think

woul~

she

ena.

She found

stranqely unable to cry or to ezperience any e•otion

~erself
afte~

~lthoagb

she believes that

that the

relieYe~

•isible disruption in

Shirley was .ery surprised at her reaction

to the whole affair.
three years,

without any

was shocked,

pieces."
to return

a qrief

reaction so

ber peculiar.

Jaaes•s death was
tinuously

however, at the funeral,

•for carrying

Shortly after the faneral,
to her hoae

tovn,

that her

friends

Shirley•s beba•ior

so well controlle4 that

praised her

she foand it

vhP.re

on

after

•er friends conwithout 9oinq

to

Shirley left tbe city
she •o•e4 in

with her

a other.
SiK aontbs later,
P.asy

deli•e~v.

to work

~vo

s~ul

was horn followinq

•nnths after Saul

as a secretary at

va~

born,

a noraal ana
S~irley

the lar'9e factory where

vent

she aet
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her present husband.
they decided to qet
off-again,

Their courtship

early in the

after six aonths of an oa•a9ain,

•a~rie~

enqageaent.

was a storay one bat

seeaed to

~ill

to

ta~e

t•e taes of

relationsbio and was oleased "1th

hawing a readf-aaae faaily.

5a•1 •ery

At the tiae treataent began the

couple were trying to hawe a child of their own, but bad not
succeeded.
As
Shirley was

clinic,
whose job
tional

it •as

con~ition

assigned to

to aake a
and

based on that judqaent.
preceding inforaation

to

vas

custoaary

a clinical

judgment about

aake

a treat•ent

in

the

~sycholoqist

Sbirler•s e•orecoaaendation

Dr. "· aet with Shirley wherein tbe
regarding her

background,

experiences, and current coaplaints vas discussed.

foraati•e
Dr.

L

judged Shirley's physical syaptoas, the headaches and atzzi•
ness, to be caused bf eaotional issues.

Like her aother, it

seeaed that Shirley bad learned to ae•elop playslcal syaptoas
as a response to eaotional probleas.Dr. !.

·.·
Sbirlef

recoaaenl!e4 tlaat

beqia weetlT outpatient psyclaotlaerapy l••e!iately

vork on her eaotional issues.

~o
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Clinical CasP. History
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-

GeorgP P., a single, white •ale, aqe fifty, had reques•ed
read~ission

gical

a Teteran•s

hospital,

again."

"Because

On admission,

tion of
he had

to

hi~

ay stoaacb

using

and sur-

been acting

•any aedical ter•s vith vbich

his disability had beco.e
the previous

constantly daring his waking hours he

He vas

food co•fortably

without fear of

he had

th~ee

ll•ost

~onths.

vas aware of Pains in
generalize~

anable to eat
vomiting.

several veet.s bP. bad lived chiefly on

lt

so seYere that

his sto•ach, a steadT •heartburn," and a
and •alaise.

up

descrip-

d~tailed

familiar in his preYioos hospitali7.ations.

been unable to vork for

of VP.akness

general

bad

George had qiYen a

comPlaint,

~eco•e

thi5 tiaP.

~dministration

ski••e~

feeling

any solid

?or

the Past

•ilk.

Ouring

this ti•e he had lost the fifteen-pound weight gain •hicb he
had accumulated

over the year

since his

last hospitaliza-

ti on.
In appearance ftr.
four inches tall,
Re valked

jauntily around

at first

~nd

qlance,

thinness of face,

a slight-built aan,

hollow-cheeked but

chair as he talked,
fact,

P was

th~

bronze~

hospital,

five feet,

in coaplexioa.

sst relaxea

in a

see•ed in general gooa spirits;
with the exception

he aopeared to

in

of his notable

be in the best of health.

Indeed, althooqh he said be was sollPvhat depressed bT having
to return to the hosoital, he
quite

frien~ly

connection

,

alth~ugh

between his

see•e~

aost cheerfal.

He was

be ad•itted that be didn't see any
ohysical illnPss

and an!

possible
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"nerYousness" and was •erely
reco•mende~

physician had

and that

it.

rule~

•ner•oasness" would be

beinq co-operatiYe because his
He

himself felt

out as a cause

he would be continued

sure that

of his illness

on a reqi•e

of •edication.

vith the possibility of surgery, as had been the case in his
prerious contacts with the hos pi ta 1.
Usually wearing a hosoital robe. e•en thou1h not confined
to bed.

be vas always neatly attired.

hair vas
reporte~

plastered down

aaainst his

that be spent a great

care and qroo•inq.
dressed in his

His thinning,
stall and

5ark

the nurses

deal of tiae in his

~ersonal

Vhen not wearing his

hospital robe he

vorting khakis and sported

a bright-colored

necktie and highly polished shoes.
This

was the

George.

Re had

sixth

read•ission

to this

first been adaitted in

his discbarqe from the •ilitary ser•ice,
plaint.

19~7

for

shortly after

•ith the saae coa-

He vas admittea the second ti•e ten years later ant1

he had been

readaitted annually since

tion of one

year.

his

hospital

secon~

with the excep-

1q~7

A stomach ulcer bad

been disco•ered on

admission in 1957, and in 19S8 be bad a resection

of the stomach vall.

Since that ti•e he had been treatea by

•arious •edications hut there had been no signs of an acti•e
ulcer in the last several hospital aa•issions.
At the

time of

this hospitalization

George •as

alone in a tinv one-roo9 apartment near thP
had been

since his

•other's death in

li•tng

hos~ital,

195~.

He

as he

had been
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employed steadily for

the past three years

for an automatic food aachine coanany,
food aachines in •arious

and other
and

in the

institu~ions

detail in
involved.
owned the

He

worked for thea.

the job

vhen it opened.

experienced worker,

busiftPss establishwents

having

George vent

and so•e of

had obtained

co•~any

refilling the coffee

local region.

explaining bis 1ob

as a ser•iceaan

into

the difficulties

throuJh a

friend who

He was thP coapany•s aost
all

outlaste~

other •en vbo had

In bis opinion, other •en quit becaase the

vork was fairly de•anding,

keeping a person on his feet all

day long and on the ao•e,

going fro• building to building.

Rot only

vas he

were stocked

responsible for

but also

addition he had

seeing that

that they vere

to collect the

recei~ts

the aachine vas full of chanqe.

and

repair;

in

•ake sure that

on call whenever a •acbine

Re was also charged

•achine service to nev fir•s

in good

Be bad to answer the co•-

plaints of the castoaers and was

broke dovn.

the aachines

with tryinq to

tbrough~ut

his area.

sell the

His vork

vas salaried, bot he aadP ertra coaaissions vbeneYer be sold
the service to a new firm.
vas proud of his service,

He f oond the wort challenging,
and

had •ade •any friends by bis

cheerful and co-operatiTP. manner.

HP. claimed that bis cus-

tomers vere. all

called hi•

very fond of him,

naae, and looked forward to
had

~xpanded

in bis

~eriod

hi~

•isits.

the fira•s business in
of

e~nloyment

by

~h~

by his first

He boasted that he

his area soae ten ti•es
coapany.

Accordin~

to
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George his ;oh occupied apnroxi•ately
h~d

he didn't •ind because he
1ob afforded hi•

ten boors a day,

very little else to do and the

a qreat deal of social

lacked elsewhere.

but

contact,

which be

However, shortly after be joined the coa-

pany bis friend vas stricken vith a heart attack and a young
relative of the friend took over the coapany.
thi~

new

e•ployer

vas letting

through disinterest and
up the hosiness
lt ti•es
did not

the

husiness

deteriorate

that Georqe•s ovn efforts

in his particular area

George felt that
want to

He felt that

see the

were unappreciated.

his nev young

eaployer actually

business eipanded

with some of George's efforts to

to build

and interfered

see nev business built up.

During George's previous periods of illness his eaployer bad
been aost onderstandina and had
there

was no

However,

definite

during

sick leave

~ast

the

less syapathetic vith his
he had

to struggle

there vas not

year

provision

on his

George's e•ployer

occasional illness.

even harder

to be

Thus be often

quite ill and

straggle~

job.

was auch

George felt

there every

a replacement for him and

becoming dissatisfied.
was feeling

not docked his pay although

lay as

his custoaers were
vent to wort when he

through the

da!.

Re

f ouna the lifting of heavy boxes of supplies and the poshing

around of large food-Yending aachines becoainq al•ost iapossible.

He finally asked for a tvo-veek

bad coaing to

•ac~tion,

hi• but which ordinarily he

which he

would have

ta~en

in aidsuaaer rather than at this tiae, just after Christ•!s.
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Ris eaployP.r
denly

resigne~

WP.eks' oar

bi• the Yacation, vbereooon George sua-

refuse~

in a fit of

anger.

period he stayed bome,

Por the

following siz

liYing at first

severance pay and thPn on unemployaent

insur~nce.

on bis
The week

before his unemploymP.nt insurance ran out George applied for
adaission to the hospital.

!!§! Bist2rI•

GP.orqe

born in a s•all,

the

V!S

"idwestern town

schoolteacher wife.

and his

admired.

younger brother

little tiae
prowess.

a~

His

to a •eterinarian and his

and ten years older than hi•-

George spoke in gloving teras
described hi•

a •ery

vas one

for his

~indly

faaily.

told bov

man whoa

ls

George's words

Ohio."

"the

e•eryone loyed and

a aart

bee• one

hi•

father's
of the

with cattle and was

5000

cows in

southern

George claiaed that "kindness and service to others"

vas the principle of his ovn

lif~.

which be had learned fro•

watching his fath@r•s work with

aniaals.

fath~r

in his firm

manner,

left

of his

his father bad

father of

junior.

Re initially

practi•e

first to utilize artifical inseaination
in

,ear his

of his father.

extensi•e Yeterinarian

George

fi•e children

His older brother and tvo sisters were

respecti•ely fifteen. tvel•e.
self,

fourth of

as a

sil~nt

person vho,

was able to subdue and

rant or •icious

anim~l.

He

Be described his
and yet tindly

vin o•er the aost recslcit-

remarked that his father vrob-

ably regarded animals as aore intelligent and as hari.ng aore
feeling

than people,

an1

in~icatea

indirectly that

father vas fairly imoatient with human stupidity.

his
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Another "•irtue" that
'is childhood

~a•e

Georqe clai•ed to

was "hard work."

responsible for aany of the

Prom

learned in

school age on

he

chores around their saall fara,

particularlT as both his parP.nts were eaployed and his
brothers and
fa•ily.
of his

sisters were

alreadf grown

and bad

olde~

left the

George denied that be resented haying to spend aost
after-~chool

hours at

these chorPs,

wished be were back on the farm.
nostalgia

of

bis

childhood years,

emphasized that although his •other
always at ho•e to
erous •eals

ta~e

particularlf

He spoke longingly of

an~

his wot her and enjoyed. llelping
despite all

the
Re

she was

to prowide genaanf friends.

butt.er, port chops for break-

fast, and his •other's baked goods.

•olunteered that

taught school,

and to entertain

bo•e•a~e

of

fresh far• food."

care of the house

for the faE.ly

safinq he often

He spoke with considerable

rewards of outdoor life and of "good,

Re

to cook froa

learne~

her around the kitchen.
of this

good,

rich

foo~

ne•er gained any weight and was always of slight build,
wiry.

•~s

He
be
and

His lean build concerned bis aotber a great deal ana

she was always anxious to fatten hi• up.
be was built auch

Bowe•er, he said,

lite his father and uo until

his illness had alvafs been able

the tiae of

to eat e•erytbinq and any-

thing without fear of beco•ing o•erweiqht.
George was

a slight.ly

bis priaary-school years,
his •other.

abowe-a •eraqe student
when be vas

Re ad•itted readily

const~ntlT

throuJhout
coached by

that this coaching bT bis

115

schoolteacher-aother
although he

vas

a

point of

quickly added that this

irritation

to

was the only

bi••

thing he

could think of about which he had actually been at oc!ds vith
her.

Apparently he was able to conYince his •other when he

began hiqh school
bat be

that he should be free

was aach less successful

where he was

s~adent

a

wuch aore interested in

size he had been an actiYe athlete.
ball tea•,

and

aqe vben he

di~

adaitte~

not ha•e

hiqh school.

sports.

Despite his

was always on the base-

with a

and to get into

by his aischieToos and somewhat

did.

Re had aany

duties and extra studies be

laugh that be often

young boys

be reached an

the required beight.

of ti•e to play

thought all

in

eyen played basketball until

companions and despite his boae
bad plentr

of her teachings.

aiscbief.

Be

eabarassed his parents

destractiYe acts - which be
Occasionally.

his aischief

brought hi• to the attention of the town constable. who took
a special

delight in

hunting hi• down

schoolteacher's son.
him,

chiefly by

restrict

hi•

Occasionally his

His parents atteaptei

adding to

to

because

the

his chores

confines

of

the

father adainistered

poral punisb•ent in the woodshed.

to

a bad

time at

the tiae he

woul~

high

was called

to the

school he

disci~li•e

fa•ilJ

to

property.

the traditional

cor-

He described hiaself as

school."

•onths prior to

was the

ana atteapting

being " a young rehel" during his teen-age years.
the teachers

~e

haTP.

who •ga•e

lpproEiaately

three

been qra4uated fro•

principal•s office

for
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infraction of one of the school rules,
~eak

of anger,

desk

and

loc~er

he threw his

demande~

his tventy-fiYe

indication that he vas quittinq
this

d~cision

later

father's response

was that

such a decision he

v~s

ke•

school.

in a

priRci~al's

on the

cents•

ev~ninq

that

at which tiae,

deposit

as

an

When be announced

to

his

if be vere

parents,

old enouqh

his

to aake

old enough to earn bis own li•ing and

fro• there on his father would

require room and board aoney

fro• hi•.
George decided anqrily
scene with his

to leaYe home.

mother be packed hi• baqs and

freiqht train out of tovn.
depression of

George found it

United States,

picking ap work where
various kinds

a tearful

toot the next

vas the first year of the

e•ploye•ent anJYhere.

forth across the

of! of

This

the 19JO•s and

find peraanent

qles,

After

difficult to

He roamed

often livinq

bact and

in hobo 1un-

he could or living teaporarily

of relief

fro• government

agencies.

Despite the many deprivations which he endured then,
tal~ed

about this period of his

enjoyable.

George

life as if it were actually

When unP.mployed, he would 90 sightseeing,

to people fro• every valk of life,
eral freedom eyen

though he ao

and live a life of qen-

lonq~r

luxury he had

been

used to in his

years

when

he

later,

returned home
verge of death.

was

talt

enjo1ea the relative

childhood.

So•~

three

approxiRately twenty-one,

for a brief visit

to find his father

he

on the

His father had suffered from an undiaqnosed
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stomach problea.

months before George's

return home

P had been told be had sto•ach cancer. where-

~r.

the elder

So•~

upon he suddenly dronpe1 his

entire

~ractice

and sat around

ho•e in what •ust have been a deep depression.
shocked to

find his

father so depressed

seek •edical care. but the father

ada~antly

that he did

~inally

not trust doctors.

P.

forced the elder "r-

and arqed

bi• to

refused,

saying

the faaily almost

into the hospital.

protests he underwent surgery.

George vas-

where o•er his

Shortl' thereafter George's

father died from pnea•onia.
After

the death

operate

the family

siblings

Ris younqer

in

approzi•ately a year,

California,

property.
vbere

tra•els around

a short

families o!

the theater

their ovn

and

in

college and was
After

George con•inced bis •other

to sell

they

Then

the country.

for four

older

lev tort.

aoved

spent so•P
Until

earned his livinq at •arious odd

and served

Ris

to

contribute to his aotber•s sup-

George had

order cook and baker.

atteanted

period.

brother had qone on to

a career

fa•ilv

~eorg~

father,

and had

at that point.

beginning

the

his

far• for

vere •arried

could not,
por~

of

to

time during

World lar

jobs.

Soathern

II,

his

~eorqe

chiefly as a short-

He vas drafted into the na•y in 19-2
years as

a cook

and baker.

Re vas

aboard ship a qreat deal of the ti•e but sav ao coabat other
th~n

the

constant strain of

occasional threat

possible subaarine

of air attack.

Re clai•s to

warfare or
have been
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deafened at one ti•e bf gunnery

practice ani was 9i•en a 10

per cent disability for hP.arinq

loss.

fro~

lfter bis discharge

the ser•ice in ,9•6, be returne1 aqain to li•e with his

he borrowed

Using some of tbe yeteran•s benefits,

•other.

•oney and went into the restaurant business. Re operated two
different restaurants

and

both of vhich failed.

Re

in the first such
funds.

o•er the

when

of

aother.

the

•i~

Although

directlr, it

which

~eorge

ap~eared

neTer

approachin~

he foresaw the

out because

had borrowed

he

mentioned his

be vas

fro•

his

inheritance

that his father's estate had been left

under the control of his •other,
able to li•e

years,

the partner ran off with the

1950's and sold

losing fonds

nert fiTe

that he had •isfortune

erolain~d

!n the second •enture,

depression of
afraid

Tentur~

~ars

vho bought a hoae and was

on the incoae from investaents

whether or not

George hiaself brought in any incoae.
George

described his

twenty years

aotber as alaost idyllic.
bis

s~are

hoae.

Re describE"d

garden that he
tion.

an~

li•inq with

bis

•she was •Y buddy.•

Be spent all

co~fortable,

that she got

tiae sure that she

where she vanted to qo.

of

vas

that she had all the co•forts of

in <1etail

the

flower and

worked on Jear after ,ear

•eqetable

for her satisfac-

Re vas an ayid fisher•an and outdoor sports•an ant! be

alvays toot
built for

his aother along.
her co•fort and

catch for her appro•al.

Be bad a

special •caaper"

alvays.broaqht back

his fishing

ll9

Despite his portrayal of hi•self as a qood boy de•oted to
kis mother,

George gave •any

hints that his

adjustaent was at times aarginal.
in

frequent trouble

babits.

vitb the

adult social

Re adaitted that he was

law because

of bis

He bad nuaerous tickets for speeding,

under tbe influence of alcohol, and later,

dri•ing

for dri•ing

vhen his license

was taken avay, for driving without a license.

Re be•oaned

the rising costs of fines for bis illegal driving practices.
lltboagh he

said that he had

the depression,

VA records
sellin~

in trouble for

lost his business

that he also had been

indicat~d

liquor to a •inor.

that his husiness partner was a

because of

Be later ad•itted
an~

qa•bler

that be biaself

bad tried to •ake money throaqb qa•bling at Tarious ti•es.
When

asked about

tiqht-liooe~

his

use

an1 so•evhat

irritated,

dran~

better adait that he

been in an altercation

alcoholics lnony•ous

He

ne•e~

strongly denied

beer,

but then

ad~ea

coutan•t afford it.

bad

He ezplained that
just the

suggested that be aiqbt qo

aeetinq;

he

felt that

as an alcoholic.

in discussinq bis •other,

one thing she would

becaae

that he

with a night nurse

unfair that he haa any reputation
other band,

saying

his record.

pre•ious e•ening becsuse she had
to an

George

at least a six-pack of beer a day

because this vas already in
be had

of alcohol,

it was
on the

he ad•itted that the

do was ot:Jen a can of beer for hi•.

that he
vith a

drank

anything

s~ronqer

than

s•ile that this was because he
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Jn discussing his

young~r

successes of his
his brother

fa~ily,

brother David.

had beco,e a

frequent plays on

•en+ioned tbe

Re

described how
~rodacer,

•ajor theatrical

Broad•a! and productions in

and •ore recently in Las
proud his •other
theater tickets

r~pe~tedly

Georqe

Vegas.

was of David
an~

a

Los Angeles,

Re remarked how extre•ely

an~

bov DaYid

plane tictet

nights of his new productions.

•ith

to go

would send her
to the

openinq

George ad•itted that be hi•-

self had seen only one or two of David's plays.

Re ad•itted

with a wink that

hoae he vas

vhen his aother was away fro•

able to qet in a little

extra fishing or clrinting which she

aiqht otherwise not approYed of.

He also descrihed Dari.d's

sqccess as particularl, a•azing because, "frankly, David vas
a sniYeling

lit~le

would eyer

a•ount to anythinq.

George reaeabered
•ost of

brat" as a child,

~hat

his tiae

As

who•
he

no one presuaed

looke~

when they were children

vith books

instead of

on it,

back

David spent

sharing tbe

far•

chores vitb George.
Asked why he had neyer

aarried,

George lauqhed and said

he had always asked that question.
been left
life had

with the responsibility
been so

~asy

neYer gotten around

an~

He decided that. he had
for his •other

wonderful

and that

with her that

to hunting for a vife.

reflect that he bad been so interested in

on~

ba~

Be

went on to

s~rts

as a voang-

ster in hiqh school that he did Yery little dating.
had

be

Re bad

girl be was Tery fond of, but always had to struqqle
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•itb several other rivals.
be

He recalled an incident in vhich

had lost his te•per and beaten

and subsequently the girl's father had
around the house because of this.
aan and •any
die~:

years later

f~rhi~den

The girl

heard

Geor~e

rival for this girl,

op a

hi• to coae
another

•~rrie1

her hashand had

th~t

On hearing this. be aade a trip back to bis hoae town

to visit ber.

Re described

her vith considerable disgust,

saying that she baa grown obese
nothino

bat a

adjust•ent.

thin 3ress."

sloopy and "was wearinq

and

lsked aore

about his

sexual

Georqe shrugged an1 said that he guessed he vas

about noraal

for a

bachelor.

houses of prosl:itation

erplaining

tkat he

once or t.vice a year "to

visite~

qet it out

of his srstea."
George's •other died
discuss the

detail~

in 1956.

of her death and his

in the saae garrulous fashion

bis voice

twice.

and his

e,es seeaed

that. she

because he had

~ad

near to

deoressea.

lingered on

that way been able

that she vas qoing to die.

was able to

he had discussed other facets

He overtly denied being

was fortunate

he

feelings about it

vas a noticeable lovering

of his life,there
in

llthoo~h

and depression
tears osee

or

saring that it

for a

long period

to get used to

the idea

He exolaiaed that she had been

an ertremely active and independent person until the tiae of
acci~ent

which

led to

approaching eighty.
slippe~,

fallen.

her

death.

She had been

even thoog'

~hopping

and broken her hip.

she

was

by herself.

bad

She •as hospitalized
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for •any
her.
her

aonths

an~

returned hoae.

where he bad

to nurse

Shortly thereafter she suffered an eabolisa which left
paralyzed and

boae.

necessitated putting

her

in a

narsinq

Bis •other continuer} to •fight off death• for another

six aonths vhile

she lay paralTzed and

al•ost unconscious.

George had quit his job as a

cook at the ti•e of ber injury

and bad stayed at ho•e

for ber. li•ing off the inco•e

c~ring

of so•P. of her in•estaents.
tinuP.d to be unemployed.

Por the follovinq year he conAfter his second hospitalization

in 1q57 for his stoaach complaint. he went back to work as a
baker.

After

his 1958 operation

his oresent

he obtaiDP.d

job.
Zt!at•ent

•eco••enaatio!.

ezaaination and

George's

laboratory reports shoved that

had soae hyoeracidity in his
not in any

current

althoaqh he

digesti•e systea.

physical danger nor

did be

physical

Georqe

ha•e anf

vas

~hysically

disabling 0 roble•s.
George was referred to a
it was to
tion and
jucJg•ent.

clinical psychologist whose job

•ake a judge•ent about
to aake a

Dr.

Geor9e•s e•otional condi-

treat•ent reco•aendation based

Pl.

•et vith Georqe whP.rein

the

on

th~t

prece~ing

inforaation reqarding bis background. for•atiTe experiences,
and current coaplaints was discussed.

It was or. Pl.'s

•ent that. as long as Georqe no

long~r

needed aedical atten-

tion.

fr?~

thought

he should be discharged
that George's

the hospital.

reoeated hospitalizations

jud~

Dr.

~.

reflected
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his desire to be sheltered from the adult world.

Although George

still sought refuge in the hospital, Dr. M. felt that George was
emotionally capable of leaving the hospital and beginning to live on
his own at this time.

Dr. M. recommended that George see a vocational

counselor to be placed innnediately in a suitable job.

Dr. M. also

recommended that George begin weekly outpatient counseling to help
George adjust to leaving the hospital and functioning in society.
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Shirley Subjects
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~ased

1.

c~~e.

on this

overa 11 clinical

hov

vnul~

IU~~!!

yoa

r~te

B!~W!!I
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, sni 6.

~aality

of nr. •.•s
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GOOO
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T!R!
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"lorP soecificallT,
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6

"
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Shirley's ohysical sy•ptoms were
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h!

111.•s ;u]q112n+ that
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3.

Rov woulil you

r~tc-

tr~t•ent

"r. "'· • s

re::o••en~ati:>n,

soecificallv that Shirley begin WPeklv outoatiPnt osvchothPraov
vor~

to

on her e•otional issues?

'EBY
POOB

SLYGRTLY

POOB

GOOD

POOB

,
~~

SLIGHTLY

GOOD

Assuap that Shirley follows or. "'·'s tre,t•ent

she recovers.

Row

~ucb

credi~

GOOD

•

3

2

T!PT

•~uld

you

~av

r~co••en~ation

Shirlev

aP.servP~
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sn~
he~

recovPrv?

l LT,.TL!

WOii!
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RUCH

'IOS'!'

lLL

TR!

or Te
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01' ,.R!

OP TllP
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CB!DI'!'

Cl!DIT

Ctt!D!~

Cl!DIT

or

'!'BE

Cl!DIT

,
4B.

2

6
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~r.

"'·'s •re!••ent
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she recovPrs.

Shirley's rP.covery?
IOI!

l

LYTTLE

SOB!

llUCR

OP TB!

or

TB!

Ol' TR!

01'

CB!DIT

CR!Dt'!'

CHDIT

Cl!DI'l'

,

2

3

TR~

'

!IOST

ILL
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TR!

OP '!'ft!

Cl!JDTT

C'lt ! ,,!'!'

fi

!~1
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~c.

she

assume that
re~oTers.

Shirley,

~r.

~hirlev

follnvs nr.

~.•s

lssu•e that 100• of the
~ ••

or

s~•e

coahination

below to assign credit for ShirlPT's

WOT! TRlT TB! P!trC!WTlG!S IUST

so~

o~

tre~t•eRt

cre~it

•ust be

the tvo.

recoTer~.

TO 100,.

Shirley aeseryes

I of the total credit.

Dr. R. 4eserTes

I

TO~lt

100 I

rP=o••end!ti~n

of t•e total credit.

~se

asslone~

to

oercen+~qe$

•~~
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she suffers CPrtain conseauences
riqht avay for hPr

p~ysic~l

fo~

not

ST•pto•s.

-

seP~ini ae~ic•l •tte~tio~

Rov

auc~

hla•e vnutd Shirle'f

deser'fe for those con!;eauences?
1 LITTL!

IOI!

or

lLL

"OCH

ROS'r

OP !'RE

O'P' TB"-

OP TB'!

OP TR!

BLl"E

BUR!

BLlft!

Btlllll!

BU"!

,

2

•

6

TBE

5~.

-ssu•e that Shirley fnllovs

111.•s tre•t•ent

~r.

9P~ic•l

she suffers certain consequences for not seekinq
riqht avay for her Ph•sical symotoms.

Rov

•u~h

rec~••eniatinn
~ttention

bla•e would nr. •

deser•e for those consequences?
101'!

A LITTL!

OP TH!

or

ILlR!

BLlRE

1

2

TB!

SOit!

"OCH

"OST

OP TB!

OP TB!

01' T!I!

BLUI!

BL1 1!1'

BtAlllP.

3

'

ILL

BLAR!

•n,
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SC.

~ssuae

she

suffer~

right

that

Or. "·'s

•re~tment

certain conseauences for not seekinq

aw-!y for her physiC'll symptoms.

blamP •ust be
tvo.

~hirley follow~

as~igned

Ose percentaqPs

tn

~hirley,

to

~elov

~r.

as~iqn

~

Dr. "· deser•es

TOTAL 100

~O

~ ••

so~P

or

co•~in9tion

bl\•e fnr tbns?.

100l.

of tbe total bla•e.

\~'

sttenti~n

th!t ,,,,,, of the

' of the total bls•e.

~

•P~ietl

A~su~e

Shirley.
ROTE TBIT THE PntCERTAGES RUST SU"

rPco~"Pnda•i~n

o~

e~nsequence~

•h~
f~r
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ISSUft! TRlT YOU 11! I CLIIICIL PSYCHOLOGIST 110

TRI~ S~I,LWT

SI! !OU IIST!ID OP DI. R.

roRPL!T!f)

1551"1! T111T YOU

JUS~

IIT!ITill •ITR SRIIL!Y WR!R!II IIPOIRITIOI l80UT RIP
POlftlTIT! !IPllI!IC!S. llD CUllllT CORPtlTITS WIS

leaember

7. Use

tha~

you 1ust

~ercentagPs

ShirlPy's ph,sical

•e~

TB~

81C~G90UID•

DISC~SS!D.

with Sbirle•.

to describe vh!t vou
s'•~to•s

WE•! TO

ar@ or

~re

sPe !S

not

thP

ch~r~P~

c~use~ ~y

e•otion!l

IOTE TRIT TR! P!IC!ITIG!S RUST SUft TO 100J.

T•e chances that Shirley•s physical
syaptoas ll! caased by e•otional iSS11es are:
The chances that Shirley's physical
syaptoas ll! IOT caused by e•otional issaes

are:~

TOTAL

,00

th~•

I

~

issu~~.
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B. use percentages to describe vhat •ou see as thP

chance~

tha•

weekly psychotherapy is the appropriate trPat•Pnt re~o••en1~+ion for
Shirley.
IOT! TBlT TB! P!ltCllTlG!S RUST SUft 'TO

Re•emb~r

th~t

you 1ust •et with

100~.

~hirley.

The chances that weekly outpatient

psrchothera~y

IS

appropriate treat•ent for Shirley are:

T~

c•ances that weekly outpatient

psyc•ot•era~y

IS IOT appropriate treataent for Shirley are:

I

TOTAL

100 I
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9. Toq have

ju~t

co~PletPd

thP

i~terview

considering various trea••Pn• options.
Dr.

~-

did, the

possi~ility

wit~

~hirlev

Yoq arP

e•otional causes of her svmptows.!f
reco••en~atior,

what do you think

following scerario will occur?

ON

P!RCFN!~G·~

~irlef

~µ!

sr~L·

c~nsi~~ri~q,

of rP.co••ending that

WP.P.klv outPatient PS!ChotheraPV i••eiia•ely to
fOU

th~

PL!~S~

~hir1PV

~eal

CTPCL~

!S

tPgin

with thP

decide to wake

ch~nces

arP

!n~

t~is

are that the
n~,

OF

~Rv

~!tnv.

will learn in therapy to talk •ore openly aboat her

feelinqs about past and current relatiODships.

Is she

proqresses in therapy, her pbfsical sy•pto•s will disappe!r
and her relationships with her •usband aad son will i•pro•e.

10 C1111cz or

CWRTlII DP

OCCORRIMG

O~~URR!W~

Ol

101

20l

301

501

601

70~

801
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10. Tou

ar~

still considering, as

n~.

~.

did, the

oo~Rihilitv

o~

reco•mendinq that 5hir1Py begin weekly outpatient psychother•nv
tn

i•me~iately

~eal

with the e•otional

If you decide to •ake this

caa~e~

reco••en~ation,

of her

what do you

chances are thlt the following scenario •ill ocear?
ONE

or

TR~

PERC1NT~~,5

ON

~Rf

SC~L!

symnto•~.

thin~

~t~~~,

the

~T-~t•

B!tnw.

Before beqinniaq therapy, Shirley's physical sr•,to•s
will worsen.

Shirley will aee a p•ysician and

that her physical sy•pto•s are caasea by a

atsc~~r

~hysical

eoa4ltioa.

•o CBlWC! or

~W~l!I

OCCURRIWG

O~~~WWTI~

01

101

201

301

501

601

701

801

901

1001

OP
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11.
OR

~ov

you •ust eyaluate the ch!nces

~cenario

12 vill occur.

TOUR

t~•t

nl'RC!~~~r.r.s

Sllirley •ill learn ill tlterapy to talt

scP."•rlo ,,

!T•~!~

ao~

~~~!

so~

·~

10~~-

ope11lT aboat Iler

feelings about past and current relatloasbi ps.

Is site

progresses in therapy, ber P'yslcal syaptoas •ill disappear
and ber relationships vitb ber ltasbaad and son will

Before beginning tlterapy,
will worsen.

S~rley•s

i•~ro•e.

pltysical syaptoas

SltirleT •ill see a pltysician and

disco~r

tbat her physical syaptoas are caased by a playsieal condition.

TR! ClllCBS OP SC!WIRtO 11 OCC91111G II!:

'

Tl! ClllCBS OP SC!llPIO 12 OCCUllRIIG II!:

I

----'!'OTIL

100 W
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12.

Listed below is

~r.

~.•s

treataent

recoaaen~ation

othPr Dossit>le trea+•ent recoaaendatiof!s for Shit'le...

follove1 h•
Jls!';a•e +hat

you are the clinical ?s .. choloqist who inter•ievP"I Shirle•.
ran~

~le~se

all the follovino treataent recowaendatior.s fro':

1•ft0ST PR!P!RR!D

R~ft!!WDlTIOW

to Sst!lST Pl!P!l!!D

,.ote that you arf' ranking each reco11aPn"lation
recomaen~ation

qPts a nuaher from

1-~

!""

an"I no tvo

l!CG~!llDl'!'tOI.

1111kP s'lrP th11+ t>ach
rer.omaen~ation~

tbe sa•P nuaber.

Be sare to read the reco••enaations carefall• so that •o• can
distinguish between the•.

ld•isP Shirley +o be1in VePkl• o!':•chotheraov an1 se!:' "
phvsici'ln if her ph•sical prohlews continue.

Jlrranqe for aore inforaation

PRO~

Shirle•

bef,r~

•akinq

a definiti•e reco11•endation.
fteet with o•her orofessionals to di!=:=uss the
•akinq a definitiTP reco••endatior..

ca~e

before

ae~
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Please assign a nu•her fro• the scale helov +o each ite•.

1~.

ST!tOWGLY

DISlGI!!

DISlG!Jf!

lGHE

STIOIGLY

SLIGHTLY

SLYGR'fLY

lGl1"!!

•

5

,

2

~hirlev

3

represente~

lGP!!

a difficult ease for anT elinie'll

psychologist.
'l't>ere ns not enough infor•'I t.ion ahoot SbirleT for !'r. •.
to
!'r.

•11li:f'

~

an appropriate reco•9endation.

should ha•e

discus~e~

the case vitb

othe~

professionals.
nr.

~.

•ade an appronriate reeoa•endation.

No •P!tter vhat, Shirley's phfsical
ehected out hy a phTsician.

~y~nto•s

sh~ul~

haYP

be~n
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1q. To achieYP the 'oll

puroo~Ps

of

thi~

ewoerimPnt, oPO"le were

assign different kinds of clinical cases.

Ple!se check the

~in1

of clinical case that you read.

A clinical

ca~e

in which the treat•ent

reco•aen~'tion

turned out to he yerT appropriate for the patient.
A clinical case in which the treat•ent reco•Men1ation
turne~

out to he

MO~

•ery

appropri~te

'or the

A clinical case in which there was

n~

vhat baooened to the oatient after

hein~

reco••endation.

TBllK IOU POI TODR COOP!llTIOW

oatie~t.

in!or•!tinn about
qi•er. ! treatmert
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THE QUESTIOllAIIE

George Subjects

140

TBEBE lBE 10 RIGHT OR IBOIG llSVEBS TO llY OP TB!S! QD!STIOIS.
IE lR! IITEB!STED II IOUB OPillOIS REGlBDllG TBIS ClS!.

POR QUESTIOIS 1-5, PL!lS! CIBCL! 01! IOBB!I B!TIBEI

1 and 6.

Based on this case, hov vould you rate the quality of Dr. ft. 1 s

1.

overall clinical judgment?
Y!BI

SLIGHTLY

SLIGHTLY

POOR

POOB

GOOD

GOOD

GOOD

JUDG!EIT

JDDG!!IT

.JODGBEIT

JDDGll!IT

JUDGft!HT
1

2.

~ore

2

3

HIT

5

6

specifically, hov vould you rate Dr. ft.• s judgment that

George vas emotionally capable of leaving the hospital?
YER!
POOB
JODG!!RT
1

SLIGHTLY

SLIGHTLY

POOi

POOR

GOOD

GOOD

GOOD

JODG!!llT

.JUDGB!WT

JODG!EH

JODG!EIT

.JUDGIBIT

2

3

fl

YEii

5

6
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3.

Row would you rate Dr. "·'s treat•ent reco••endation,

specifically that George be discharged fro• the hospital, tbat he
see a Yocational counselor to be placed in a suitable job and

t~at

he begin weekly outpatient counseling to help with the adjust•ent.
SLIGHTLY

SLIGHTLY

POOR

POOR

GOOD

GOOD

GOOD

.JUDG"!IT

.JUDGHIT

.JUDG!!IT

.JUDGllHT

.JUDGll!ft

l!BY

POOR
JODG!l!T

2

QA.

Hit

5

3

6

Assu•e that George follows Dr. ft.'s treat•ent reco••endation and

be recoyers.

How •uch credit would you say George deseryes for his

recovery?
l LITTLE

1011!

SOii!

RUCH

llOST

lLL

THE

OP THE

or

THE

OP TBE

OP THE

or

CREDIT

CB!DIT

CREDIT

CIEDIT

Cl!DI~

Cl!DIT

or

3

2

s

II

'!'BE

6

Assu•e that George follows Dr. "·'s treat•ent reco••endation

~B.

and he recovers.

How •ucb credit would you say Dr. "· deserves for

George's recovery?
IOllE

l LI'l'TLE

SORE

llUCB

llOST

or

or

TBE

01 '!'BE

or

Cl!DIT

Cl!DI'l'

CllDIT

2

3

or

THE

THE

CIEDI'!'
II

THE

CllDIT

s

lLL

or

TB!

CHDIT
6
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~c.

Assuae that George follows Dr. "·•s treataent reco••endation and

be recoYers.

Assu•e that 1001 of the credit •ust be assigned to

George, Dr. "·• or some co•bination of the tvo.
to assign credit for George's recowery.
IOT! TBlT TB! PBBC!RTlG!S IDST SO! TO 1001.

t~e

George deserYes

I of

Dr. !. deserwes

I of the total credit.

TOTlL

100 I

total credit.

Use percentages below
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ijC.

Assume that George follows Dr. ft.•s treatment recomaendation and

he recovers.
George, Dr.

Assume that 1001 of the credit aust be assigned to
ft.,

or some coabination of the tvo.

to assign credit for George's recovery.
IOTE TBlT TBE PBBC!ITlG!S BOST SOB TO 1001.

George deserwes

~

I of

Dr.

~

I of the total credit.

ft.

deserves

TOTlL

100 I

~e

total credit.

Use percentages below
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5A.

Assume that George follows Dr. Pl.'s treatment recommendation and

he suffers certain consequences for not receiving inpatient
psychiatric care right avay.

Hov •uch bla•e would George deserwe

for tlose consequences?
l LITTLE

IOIE

SORE

BUCH

llOST

lLL

OF THE

OF THE

OF THE

OF TBE

or

BLlllE

BLUIE

BLlllE

BLl" E

BLll!!

BLlll!

2

3

4

5

f.i

SB.

Assume that George follows Dr.

~-'s

TBE

or

TBE

treatment reco••endation and

he suffers certain consequences for not receiving inpatient
psychiatric care right away.

Row much blame would Dr. II. deserve

for those consequences?
IOI!

or

THE

BLl!E

l LITTLE
01' THE

BLll'I E
2

SO!IE

TB!

01'

_ BLll!E
3

lLL

llUCB

llOST

OF 'l'BE

or

BLll'I E

BLlllE

BLUE

4

5

6

THE

OP 'l'BE
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Sc.

Assume that George follows Dr. M.'s treatment reco••endation and

he suffers certain consequences for not receiTing inpatient psyciatric
care right away.

Assu•e that

100~

of the blame •ust be assigned to

George, Dr. M., or so•e co•bination of tbe two.

Use percentages below

to assign bla•e for those consequences for George.
IOTE THAT TB! PERC!llTAG!S !DST SUR TO 1001.

I of

George deserwes
Dr.

ft.

deserwes

~~-

TOTAL

t~e

total bla•e.

I of tile total blaae.

100 I
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lSSIRIE THAT YOU lRE 1 CLIIIClL PSYCHOLOGIST llD CBOBGI WBIT TO
YOU IISTElD OP DB. fl.

~II

lSSU!E TBlT YOU JOST CO!PL!TED TB! IITBIYISW

WITH GEORGE IHEBEII IIFOB!lTIOI &BOUT BIS BlCIGBOUID. POIBITIT!
EIPEBIEICES. lHD COBB!IT CO!PLlIITS WlS DISCUSSED.

Re•ember that you just •et with George.

7.

Use percentages to describe vhat you see as the chances that

George is emotionally capable of leaving the hospital.
IOTE TBlT THE PEBC!ITlGES !UST SO! TO 1001.
The chances that Ceorge IS e•otionally
capable of leawing the hospital are:

I

The chances that George IS IOT e•otionally
capable of leaYing the hospital are:

TOTAL 100 I
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B. Ose percentages to describe vhat you see as the chances that
being discharged from the hospital, being placed in a suitable
job, and beginning weekly COQnseling is the appropriate treat•ent
recom•endation for George.
10!! TBlT TB! PBBCEllTlG!S BOST

so"

TO 1001.

Re•e•ber that you just •et with George.

T•e chances that a hospital 4isc•arqe. a suitable
job, and weekly counseling IS appropriate treat•ent
for Georqe are:

_1

The chaaces that a hospital 4ischarge, a suitable
job. and weekly counseling IS IDT appropriate
treataent for George are: •••••••••••••••••••••••••

I

TOTlL 100 I
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9. You have just

co•plete~

the interview with George and you are

considering various treat•ent options.

Jou are considering , as

Dr. "· did, the possibility of reco•mending that George be
discharged from the hospital to begin a new job and weekly
outpatient counseling.

If you decide to •ake this reco•mendation,

what do you think the chances are that the following scenario will
occur? PLEASE CIRCLE ONE OF TRE PEPCENTAGES OM TRE SCALE BELOW.

The new job and the weekly coaaseling sessioas will laelp
greatly to build George's confideace aad sense of well-being.
George will becoae increasiagly secure about functioniag
in society and his physical syaptoas will subside.

10 CBllCE OF

CllTlII OP

OCCOBBIIG

OCCUllIIG

01

101

201

301

501

601

701

801

901

1001
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10.You are still considering. as Dr.

ft.

did. the possiblity of

recommending that George be discharged fro• the hospital to beqin
a new job and veekly outpatient counseling.

If you decide to aate

this recomaendation, what do you think the chances are that the
following scenario vill occur? (Please circle a number fro• the
scale l:ielov)

I••ediately after beinq discliarqed fro• the hospital. Geor9e
will becoae oYer•helaed vitb anxiety.

George •ill be anable

to leawe his apart•ent and will atteapt saicide.

or

10 CHllCE OF

CBllTlII

OCCUBBIIG

OCCUDIIG

101

20I

30I

501

601

701

80I

901

1001
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11.

Nov you aust evaluate the chances that EITHER scenario t 1

or scenario 12 vill occur.

~fINA.B,!Q

YOUR PERCENTAGES ~UST so~ TO 1001.

!l

!he new job and the weekly counseling sessions will help
greatly to build George's confidence and sense of well-being.
George vill become

incr~singly

secure about functioning in

society and bis playsical sy•pto•s will subside.

~f!fil!IO

!l

l•aediately after being discharged fro• tbe hospital, George
will beco•e o•ervbelaed with anxiety.

George •ill be ••able

to lea•e bis apartaent and will atteapt suiciae.

TBE CHllCES OP SC!lllIO 11 OCCOllIIG II!:
TB! CHllCES OP SC!llBIO 12 OCCOllIIG lB!:

_1
I

!OTlL 100 I
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12.

Listed belov is Dr. ft.'s treatment recommendation followed by

other possible treat•ent reco••endations for George.
are the clinical psychologist who interviewed George.

Assu•e that you
Please rank

all the following treatment reco••endations from:
1=ft0ST PBEFEBBED BECO!IEIDlTIOI to 5=LElST PBEPEBIED IECOBIBIDlTIOI.
Note that you are ranking each reco•mendation so •ake sure that each
recosmendation gets a

nu~ber

from 1-5

an~

no two reco•mendations get

the saae number.
Be sure to read the recoa•enaations carefully so

t~at

yo• can

distinguish between the•.

Discharge George

fro~

the hospital, place bi• in a

job and weekly outpatient counseling.
Discharge George fro• the hospital and place hi• in a
halfvay house for 11en as a transition to living and
working on his ovn.
Refer George to the inpatient psychiatric unit of the
hospital right away.
lrrange for aore inforaation fro• George before aaking
a definitive recommendation.
fteet with other professionals to discuss the case before
aaking a definitive reco••endation.
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13.

Please assign a nuaber from the scale below to each itea.

DISlGBEE

STIOIGLt

DISlGBEE

2

1

STIOIGLt

DISlGBB!

lGB!E

SLIGHTLY

SLIGHTLY

lGl!B

lGIZ!

5

6

3

George reoresented a

diffic~lt

case for any clinical

psychologist.
There vas not enough inforaation about George for Dr.
to make an appropriate reco•mendation.
Dr.

e. should have discussed the case vitb other

professionals.
Dr.

e. aade an appropriate

recommend~tion.

No matter what, Georqe should have
hospital for •ore e•otional help.

b~en

kept in the

~
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14. To achieve the full purposes of this experiaent, people were
assigned different kinds of clinical cases.

Please check the kind

of clinical case that you read.

A clinical case in which the

treat~ent

recommendation

turned out to be very appropriate for the patient.
A clinical case in which the treat•ent reco•mendation
turned out to be NOT very appropriate for the patient.
~

clinical case in which there vas no information about

what hapoened to tte oatient after being given a treataent
recommendation.

TBllK 100 FOB !OUR COOP!BITIOI
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